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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation provides theoretical and empirical explorations of the impacts that 
the internal migration has on inequality in source regions. Chapter 2 identifies the lack 
of microeconomic contents, especially those on intra-household economic linkages as 
the primary reason why the Roy model may give misleading predictions on the 
impacts in developing countries like China. Keeping this drawback in mind, Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 extend the Roy model by combining its statistical assumptions with simple 
yet stylized models capturing decisions of income-maximizing rural households 
constrained by factor endowments. Comparing to the original model, the extended 
models have more solid microfoundations, they relate also to a different statistical 
problem, i.e. censoring rather than truncation. The difference in statistical structure 
leads to different predictions on the impacts. Particularly, in an empirically relevant 
setting where different types of labor inputs are heterogeneous in productivity but 
perfectly substitutive in household agriculture, Chapter 4 shows that unlike the 
original model, the extended model admits decreasing, constant and increasing rural 
inequality. Chapter 4 highlights also the non-causal relationships between the pattern 
of selection and the direction of change of rural inequality. Chapter 6 tests these 
relationships with the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data. It is found 
that the pattern of selection of rural-to-urban migration in China could undergo two 
transitions between 1991 and 2009. Nevertheless, the directions of change of rural 
inequality predicted using patterns of migration selection could disagree with the data 
in certain sub-period. Further analysis attributes much of these disagreements to a 
well-known puzzle that the actual size of migration is often smaller than its prediction 
based on observed intersectoral wage gap. Chapter 6 offers thus several preliminary 
explanations to help resolve this puzzle. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past three decades, China has experienced one of the largest internal migrations 
in the human history. In the period between 1978 and 2013, yearly around 5.3 million 
of rural residents left for the cities and around 7.4 million of agricultural workers got 
employed in non-farm industries.1 Consequently, the percentage of rural employment 
fell in this period from 76.3 to 61.0, whereas the percentage of agricultural 
employment fell even more sharply from 70.5 to 39.6. 
 
Figure 1.1: Declines in Shares of Rural and Agricultural Employments 
Source: The data on the total employment, employments in the rural region and in the primary industry 
are available from Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2014, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and China Compendium of 
Statistics 1949-2008, Table 1-4. Calculations of the ratios are my own. 
As migration occurs elsewhere, the rural-to-urban migration in post-reform 
China is also selective: Rural residents who choose to leave countryside and work in 
                                               
1 The yearly flows of migration are estimated using the formula: M(t,t+1)=L(t)[1+g(t,t+1)]-L(t+1). L(t) 
in the formula denotes the total rural/agricultural employment in the year t, g(t,t+1) denotes the natural 
growth rate of the rural/agricultural employment between years t and t+1. Considering that no data on 
the natural growth rate in specific region or sector is available in official statistics in China, I replace 
them with the growth rate of total employment in the same year. For more statistical details, the reader 
may refer to Hu (2010). 
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the urban non-agricultural sector have usually different individual characteristics and 
household backgrounds, and hence different earning capacities in comparison with 
populations at the source and destination. There exist already ample empirical 
evidences supporting for this observation.2 
The enormously large and selective rural-to-urban migration must have profound 
effects on many aspects of the Chinese economy such as growth, industrialization, 
international trade, income distribution. In this thesis, however, I will confine myself 
to just one aspect of them, namely the impacts that rural-to-urban migration has on the 
income distribution in rural China. 
I am interested in this very specific research question mainly for two reasons: 
Firstly, this is because the question relates closely to the welfare of large and 
relatively poor population subgroup in China, namely the rural residents. Many 
empirical studies report a rising trend of inequality among rural residents.3 Some of 
these studies argue further that rural-to-urban migration occurring at roughly the same 
period should be responsible for a substantial fraction of the increase in rural 
inequality. After reviewing these arguments, however, it is determined that most of 
these studies are based on flawed economic reasoning, casual observations in 
combination with sparse empirical findings, and thus may not be convincing. 
Therefore, the present thesis intends to provide a solid and more general theoretical 
analysis on the relationships between the rural-to-urban migration and rural inequality. 
Secondly, this is also because the question is interesting of its own right. In particular, 
it can be viewed as a counterpart to the question on the impacts of immigration on the 
                                               
2 Greenwood (1997) provides an excellent survey on the economic issues about internal migration in 
context of developed countries, which includes an extensive discussion on the individual characteristics 
of migrants. For the characteristics of rural-to-urban migrants in China, interested reader may refer to 
Zhao (2004) and Lu (2008). 
3 See for example, Benjamin et al. (2008), Li (2003), Ravallion and Chen (2007). 
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destination labor market and inequality in that market, which has been the focus of the 
scholarly debates for last few decades and has lead to noticeable progresses in 
understanding the functioning of labor market facing with external labor supply 
shocks.4 At a higher level of abstraction, both questions are similar in all aspects 
except for the direction of worker flows and regions considered. The close analogy 
between two literatures enables us to learn from the immigration and destination 
literature when studying the question of this thesis. Meanwhile, considering that the 
question of this thesis is less frequently studied than its counterpart,5 some lights 
could be shed on the immigration and destination literature at lower costs by studying 
the present question. I believe these reasons suffice to justify my explorations.6 
To identify the relationship between rural-to-urban migration and rural inequality, 
I may take different routes. For reasons that migration is often regarded as a selective 
process, and that the widely used Roy model7 offers a direct linkage between self- 
selective behaviors at large, including migration of individual agents and the resulted 
distributional impacts at some aggregate levels, this thesis adopts the Roy model as 
                                               
4 See for example, Card (1990), Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2011), Lewis (2003, 2012). 
For excellent reviews covering this issue, the reader may refer to Borjas (1999), Blau and Kahn (2015). 
5 Mishra (2007) is a noticeable exception. 
6 Although in this thesis, I focus mostly on relationships between rural-to-urban migration and its 
distributional impacts on the source regions with explicit reference to the post-reform Chinese 
experiences, my research could offer insights to investigations in other contexts, both in developing and 
developed countries. This is firstly because the massive migration leaving agricultural for non- 
agricultural sectors is by no means unique in China, it is in fact a worldwide phenomenon and is of 
great importance for the developing countries today. According to a report of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO, 2011, Table A4), the agricultural share of labor force fell from 65.3 percent to 48.2 
percent in countries in developing regions during 1980 and 2010. Migration could have large impacts 
on income distributions in source regions. This is also because my research could be relevant to the 
developed countries in history and now. Historically, Kuznets (1955) uses the intersectoral migration as 
one of the main mechanisms to explain the change of income inequality in the process of economic 
growth. The large-scaled unskilled immigration, as argued in the main text, which is a counterpart for 
out-migration, has often caused serious social-economic problems in developed countries today and 
thus remains a focus of academic discussions for decades. 
7 The model is named after A. D. Roy who published his seminal paper in 1951. It is also called as the 
Roy-Borjas model, for Borjas (1987) is the first paper that presents a simple and parametric two-sector 
Roy model. 
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the departure for all theoretical discussions. 
Therefore, in the first half of Chapter 2, I review briefly the so-called standard 
Roy model with emphases on its basic assumptions and its key predictions on the 
patterns of migration selection and particularly on the impacts that the intersectoral 
migration has on source inequality. The prediction on the changes of source inequality 
is then contrasted with a well-known conjecture in literature and the observation of 
rising rural inequality to reveal some potential inconsistencies. The second half of 
Chapter 2 begins a series of theoretical efforts aiming at understanding and 
reconciling these inconsistencies. I find the lack of microeconomic contents, 
especially those relating to the intra-household economic linkages in the standard Roy 
model is most likely to explain these inconsistencies. 
As responses to the drawback of the standard Roy model, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
build several simple yet highly stylized models to capture income-maximizing rural 
households’ interrelated production, labor supply and migration decisions in three 
settings of increasing complexity where labor inputs are assumed to be homogeneous, 
heterogeneous and perfectly substitutive, heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutive. 
These microeconomic models combine then with the largely statistical assumptions of 
the standard Roy model. Because these extended Roy models take the intra-household 
economic linkages that are totally missing in the standard Roy model into account, 
they serve as proper analytical frameworks for studying the relationships between 
out-migration and change of rural inequality in Chapters 3 and 4, but to a lesser extent 
in Chapter 5. Particularly, in the setting discussed in Chapter 4 that turns out to have 
the highest empirical relevance, I find the approximate non-causal relationships 
between the pattern of migration selection and direction of change of rural inequality 
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as follows. Out-migrations exhibiting positive sorting tend to coexist with increase in 
rural inequality; out-migrations exhibiting negative sorting tend to coexist with 
decrease in rural inequality; migrations exhibiting non-hierarchical sorting are 
compatible to both increase and decrease in rural inequality. 
Chapter 6 tests these theoretical relationships using datasets collected in the 
Chinese Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS), 1991-2009. The preliminary results 
suggest some disagreements between theory and data. I give thus several possible 
explanations for the disagreement. Empirical explorations in this chapter yield also 
insights for broader researches. Particularly, evidences show that different types of 
labor inputs in agriculture in China during the period 1991-2009 can be best described 
as heterogeneous and perfect substitutive labor inputs. Moreover, Chapter 6 reports 
for the first time in literature that the pattern of migration selection could undergo two 
transitions in the period. Chapter 7 summarizes this thesis and offers preliminary 
discussions on policy implications of my theoretical and empirical explorations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ROY MODEL AND ITS MICROECOMOMIC CONTENTS 
In this Chapter, I provide firstly a brief review on the theoretical aspect of the Roy 
model.8 This review emphasizes basic assumptions of the Roy model and its key 
predictions on the pattern of selection and on the impacts that intersectoral migration 
has on the inequality at the source. Notice that the review is more than a collection of 
standard results available from existing studies.9  By reviewing the literature, I 
demonstrate that the prediction of the Roy model on the impacts of migration on 
inequality at the source contradicts with a well-known theoretical conjecture and the 
prediction is potentially inconsistent with the observation of rising inequality in rural 
China. These inconsistencies motivate the following theoretical explorations starting 
from the second half of this chapter and continuing through Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
2.1 A Review on the Roy Model 
The basic assumptions shared by most of studies that use the Roy model as main 
analytical framework can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The Roy model assumes that the underlying distribution of the log wages that 
a heterogeneous population of workers face in the source sector 0 and the host 
sector 1 is jointly bivariate normal such that 
 
. . .
0 1 0 1 0 1 01(log , log ) ~ ( , , , , )
i i d
w w N      ,  (2.1) 
                                               
8 This review does not cover the empirical aspect of the Roy model, since they are often technical and 
thus beyond the scope of this review. For a comprehensive survey on the empirical issues of the Roy 
model and its various extensions, readers may see French and Taber (2011). 
9 Most of these materials in this review are standard, thus results in the text are often given without 
complete proof. Readers may see Appendix A for mathematical details. Readers may also refer to 
original studies such as Borjas (1987), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) and Gould (2002). 
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where 0 1,     denote the mean log wages in sectors 0 and 1, 0 1,     denote the 
standard deviations of log wages in sectors 0 and 1, while 01  denotes the 
correlation coefficient between log wages in both sectors. 
(2) The Roy model assumes further that all workers in the population of interest 
are wage-income maximizers in the sense that they choose to work in the sector 
where they receive the highest wages. To be concrete, if a worker chooses to be 
employed in sector 1, he must earn higher wage in sector 1 than what he could 
earn in sector 0. Consequently, the observed log wages resulted from the self- 
selection takes the form of 
 0 1log max{log , log }w w w . (2.2) 
(3) Last but not the least, the Roy model assumes that the post-selection log 
sectoral wage distribution can be obtained by truncating underlying log sectoral 
wage distribution. Correspondingly, the level of post-selection inequality of 
sectoral wage distribution can be measured by a truncated variance.10  For 
instance, the observed post-selection wage inequality in the source sector 0 is 
given by 0 0 1(log | log log )Var w w w . 
To differentiate from various extensions of the Roy model developed in 
subsequent chapters, I call henceforth the model satisfying all three basic assumptions 
listed above as the standard Roy model henceforth. 
Following Borjas (1987), I categorize all intersectoral migrations into three 
patterns of selection, namely the positive sorting, the negative sorting and the non- 
                                               
10 See Greene (2007), Chapter 24 for discussions on the truncated distribution and its moments. 
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hierarchical sorting.11,12 Roughly speaking, the positive sorting refers to cases in 
which out-migrants from sector 0 outperform on average other workers from the same 
population when they were employed in both sectors. The negative sorting refers to 
cases in which out-migrants are outperformed on average by other workers in both 
sectors. The non-hierarchical sorting refers to the rest of cases in which out-migrants 
are outperformed on average by other workers on average in the source sector 0, but 
outperform on average other workers in the host sector 1. The sufficient and necessary 
conditions associating with each of the three patterns of selection in terms of 
distributional parameters are as follows:13 
 Positive Sorting: 01 0 1 0 1/ , and       ;  (2.3) 
 Negative Sorting: 01 1 0 0 1/ ,  and       ;  (2.4) 
 Non-hierarchical Sorting: 01 0 1 1 0min{ / ,  / }     .  (2.5) 
Considering that the standard Roy model admits three patterns of selection, one 
may conjecture that intersectoral migrations of different patterns of selection could 
result in different impacts on the inequality in the source sector 0. However, it turns 
out that the standard Roy model rejects such conjecture. Under its basic assumptions, 
formal derivation relying heavily on the properties of truncated normal distribution 
shows clearly that the level of post-selection inequality must be lower than its 
                                               
11 In Borjas (1987), the third pattern of migration selection is called as the “refugee sorting”. However, 
considering that this pattern of selection is not restricted to the migration of refugees, the non- 
hierarchical sorting would be a more appropriate name for most cases. Note that unlike other patterns 
of selection, if the migration exhibits non-hierarchical sorting, then the “skill” of workers must be 
multi-dimensional. Otherwise, as long as the wages in both sectors are positively monotonic 
transformations of the one-dimensional skill, a group of workers who outperform others in one sector 
must outperform other workers in another sector, too. 
12 There is no fourth pattern of migration selection for the reason that its existence would imply the 
correlation coefficient between wages earned in both sectors exceeds unity, which is clearly untrue. 
13 See Appendix A for details. 
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pre-selection level, that is,14 
 0 0 1 0(log | log log ) (log )Var w w w Var w  .  (2.6) 
 
In other words, the standard Roy model predicts unambiguously that intersectoral 
migration, regardless of its pattern of selection, always reduces the wage inequality in 
the source sector. 
The result given by equation (2.6) has been derived in a quite general setting. 
Thus, it could have large potential to be applied to the concrete setting focused by this 
thesis. For the present setting, this result should be read as the selective rural-to-urban 
migration always reduces the wage inequality in rural regions of China, and this result 
is unaffected by the pattern of migration selection. 
This prediction is clearly inconsistent with a well-known theoretical conjecture 
shared by Lipton (1980) and Li (2003), among others, namely the pattern of migration 
selection and change of rural inequality caused by migration are often closely related. 
Out-migrations of different patterns are likely to have qualitatively different impacts 
on the rural inequality. In particular, some authors argue further that the positive 
sorting out-migration tends to increase the rural inequality, while other patterns of 
out-migrations tend to decrease the rural inequality. 
Furthermore, if this prediction could be justified, then unlike the belief holding 
by many scholars, rural-to-urban migration cannot explain the rising inequality 
observed in rural China. To the contrary, the selective rural-to-urban migration should 
be considered as a counterforce that offsets in part the increase in rural inequality 
                                               
14 See Appendix A for details. 
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resulted from other factors, notably the skill biased technical change. 
Both inconsistencies need to be better understood and reconciled. In fact, all of 
the theoretical explorations below can be viewed as efforts made in this direction. 
2.2 The Microeconomic Contents of the Roy model 
The standard Roy model has been employed to study a wide range of self-selective 
behaviors, notably individual agents’ occupational, regional, educational choices and 
their aggregate market implications. The popularity of this model may reflect two of 
its features. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the model is indeed a unified and 
analytically convenient framework;15 on the other hand, it may also suggest that the 
model provides little beyond that framework – otherwise, we should not expect self- 
selective behaviors with such varying natures could all fit into the same framework. 
As the review of the standard Roy model shows, two of three of its basic assumptions, 
i.e. assumptions (1) and (3) are mainly statistical. They describe the distribution of log 
sectoral wages and how it changes during the migration. Only one of its basic 
assumptions, i.e. assumption (2) concerns the microeconomic contents of the model, 
but it is still based on a choice problem of the simplest kind.16 Therefore, it is 
legitimate to criticize the standard Roy model for its lack of microeconomic contents 
– at least, most of its microeconomic contents hide behind the statistical descriptions. 
The lack of or say, the ambiguity in microeconomic contents of the standard Roy 
model could be partially responsible for the two inconsistencies mentioned above. 
 
                                               
15 Empirical inclined economists find the Roy model attractive, mainly because this simple model can 
be used to motivate procedures to correct the selection biases. 
16 The term “microeconomic contents” is borrowed from the survey of Neal and Rosen (2000). The 
following theoretical exploration that emphasizes the microeconomic contents of the Roy model is 
partly inspired by their evaluation. 
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To clarify and enrich the microeconomic contents of the standard Roy model, I 
can rely nothing but its basic assumptions, especially its two mainly statistical 
assumptions (1) and (3). 
By looking at its basic assumption (1), it becomes clear that this assumption 
states only that the log underlying wages are jointly normally distributed, but it 
remains silence about the source of heterogeneity in earning capacity. Different from 
the conventional practice that attributes all earning heterogeneity indifferently into the 
heterogeneity in vaguely defined skills, inspired by the econometric literature, I 
propose in this thesis to decompose the log underlying wage that an agent i could earn 
in sector j, log jiw  into several components, each of which has relatively clear 
economic interpretation such as 
 
log ,ji j jiw     
(2.7) 
where j  denotes the mean of log wages in sector j; ji  denotes the demeaned 
error term that measures the deviation of the wage that an individual agent i could 
earn in sector j from j . The demeaned error term can be further decomposed as: 
 
.ji i ji ji       (2.8) 
The first term i  in equation (2.8) refers to the agent-specific fixed effect. The 
skill components associating with i  are valued the same in both sectors and thus 
can be perfectly transferred across sectors. Typical examples for i  include the 
earning heterogeneity relating to skill components acquired from elementary and 
secondary educations as well as to the innate ability. The second term ji  refers to 
 12 
 
the earning heterogeneity relating not only to individual agents’ characteristics, but 
also to the sector where they work. The skill components associating with ji  are 
often valued differently across sectors and thus cannot be perfectly transferred. 
Typical examples for ji  are often related to the sector-specific physical or human 
capital. The third term ji  in equation (2.8) is the residual of the conceptual 
decomposition and it refers to pure noises or unexplained components in the wage 
data. 17  Thus, ji  has often no clear economic interpretation. To simplify the 
discussions below, I ignore the residual term ji , while focus on i  and ji .   
Hence, the demeaned error term ji  can be decomposed approximately as: 
 
.ji i ji     (2.9) 
Hereafter, equations (2.7) and (2.9) are called as the wage decomposition 
formulas. These formulas provide useful guidance for the theoretical explorations in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In Chapter 3, I begin by considering the question on the impact 
that out-migration has on rural inequality in a simple homogeneous labor setting in 
which the error term i  and components of ji  relating to individual agents’ skills 
are assumed the same for all rural workers. In Chapters 4 and 5, the assumption of 
labor homogeneity will be gradually relaxed. Both i  and ji  are allowed to be 
univariate random variables with non-degenerate distributions. I will revisit the same 
question in heterogeneous labor settings with increasing complexity. 
Furthermore, according to assumption (3) of the standard Roy model, the post- 
migratory wage inequality in rural regions should be measured by the truncated 
                                               
17 In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
ji
  includes also errors introduced by first-order Taylor’s approximation. 
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variance 0 0 1(log | log log )Var w w w , that is, the wage inequality among those who 
choose to stay in rural regions. Given that in the standard Roy model the economic 
linkages among individual agents are almost entirely absent, the usage of truncated 
variance seems justified. This is because in absence of inter-personal linkages, out- 
migration of some agents leaves no impact on wages of staying agents, and wages 
earned by out-migrants do not count in measuring the rural inequality. Nevertheless, 
for numerous other situations, economic linkages among individual agents at the 
source, especially those among migratory and staying members from the same 
households could be so strong that the neglect of these linkages would lead to 
misleading predictions. 
The economic linkages between migratory and staying members of rural 
households can be sorted roughly into two categories. For the first category, the 
withdrawal of labor services provided by migratory members will affect staying 
members’ agricultural productivities and hence wage incomes by changing the 
amounts and composition of inputs of farms. For the second category, there exists 
usually income pooling to different degrees between migratory and staying members. 
In fact, the remittance emphasized in literature can be viewed as a special case of the 
income pooling mechanisms. A simple way to incorporate both categories of intra- 
household economic linkages into analysis would be to assume that rural households 
behave as if they were unities attempting to maximize given objectives such as total 
incomes adjusting for the perfectness of intra-household income pooling.18 
As for the context focused by this thesis, namely rural-to-urban migration and 
rural regions in China, a plenty of evidences suggest that these intra-household 
                                               
18 The perfectness of intra-household income pooling can be interpreted alternatively as the degree of 
altruism of migratory members towards staying members. Usually, the degree of altruism has its value 
between 0 and 1. 
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economic linkages could be of particular importance. Firstly, like in many developing 
countries, household farms undertake the majority of agricultural production in post- 
reform China. Since factor markets in rural regions are often incomplete, households 
have limited access to these markets and thus have to rely heavily on the largely 
predetermined cultivated land and labor services provided by their members in 
agricultural production. Consequently, out-migrations of some household members 
caused by the emergence of urban employment are likely to have big effects on the 
amounts and composition of agricultural inputs of household farms and hence on 
staying members’ wage incomes. Secondly, a large fraction of Chinese rural migrants 
are temporal migrants in the sense that they will eventually return to rural regions. 
Besides, household members such as elders and children are often left behind during 
their urban employments. Therefore, migratory members may have strong incentives 
to share incomes with staying members. Hence, the income pooling among household 
members could be quantitatively important. To avoid introducing the arbitrariness by 
allowing the perfectness of income pooling to vary, unless stated otherwise, this thesis 
assumes perfect income pooling for all rural households. 
For the rest of theoretical explorations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I make efforts to 
build a series of simple yet highly stylized models to capture income-maximizing 
rural households’ agricultural production, labor supply and migration decisions made 
subjective to various factor market environments and in different settings regarding 
the heterogeneity and substitution among labor inputs. Then I combine these micro- 
economic models with the largely statistical framework of the standard Roy model, 
especially with its powerful assumption of joint normality of log sectoral wages in the 
hope of achieving a thorough understanding on the microeconomic contents of the 
Roy model. More importantly, by doing so, intra-household economic linkages that 
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are missing in the standard Roy model can be incorporated into the extended Roy 
models. In comparison with the standard Roy model, these extended Roy model have 
more solid microfoundations and thus they can offer appropriate frameworks for 
formal analysis of the research question. 
To close the model, I introduce additional assumptions on the urban sector. Note 
that to keep the discussions in subsequent chapters manageable, simple assumptions 
are preferred. In particular, this thesis always adopts a succinct assumption on the 
urban sector, namely equally skilled rural workers face the exogenously given wage 
rate in that sector. This thesis abstracts the migration costs entirely from theoretical 
explorations, partly because until recently, the economic profession knows very little 
about the size, functional form and distribution of them.19 This is also because this 
thesis intends to examine how far one can go without resorting to the puzzling 
migration costs.20 Moreover, for the reason that the Hukou system21 can be largely 
understood as an institution that imposes restrictions on rural-to-urban migration by 
raising migration costs faced by rural migrants, and that migration costs are ignored in 
theoretical explorations, the Hukou system will not be discussed explicitly below. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 The intense exchange between Borjas (1987) and Chiswick (1999) reminds us the importance of the 
functional form of migration costs in determining the pattern of migration selection and other related 
issues. It also shows the ignorance of the economic profession about migration costs. Borjas (2014) 
offers a sharp yet highly interesting criticism on the reverse engineering practices in choosing 
functional form of migration costs. 
20 Katz and Murphy (1992) use a similar strategy to study the change of wage structure in the United 
States. 
21 The Hukou system can be translated literally as the “household registration system”. For details on 
this system, interested readers may see Cheng and Selden (1994) or a recent survey by Chan (2009). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACTS OF OUT-MIGRATION: THE MODEL WITH 
HOMOGENEOUS LABOR 
In this chapter, I begin the theoretical exploration of the impacts of out-migration on 
income distribution in rural regions using an extended Roy model as analytical 
framework. To keep the exploration tractable, throughout this chapter I assume all 
rural workers are intrinsically homogeneous in productivity. Further discussions 
allowing for various kinds of labor heterogeneity, which is an issue that complicates 
the exploration will be left as the main task for next two chapters. 
3.1 The Unconstrained Maximization Problem 
As suggested in Chapter 2, I consider firstly a simple maximization problem faced by 
each rural household. In this model, households try to maximize total incomes by 
allocating labor endowments 0L  between the agricultural production on their own 
farms and emerging urban non-agricultural employments. Thus, the maximization 
problem of any rural household is given by 
 
0 0
1max ( , ) ( )
L
f A L w L L  , (problem 3.1) 
where the production function (.)f  represents the technology adopted by rural 
household that combines two types of inputs, namely land (A) and homogeneous labor 
(L) into the final agricultural output whose price is normalized at unity. (.)f  is 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing, concave and linearly 
homogeneous. To reflect the observation that a large fraction of rural households do 
not abandon agricultural production entirely after the emergence of opportunities for 
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rural residents to be employed in urban sector, or in short, to reflect the feature of 
partial out-migration, (.)f  is further assumed to satisfy one of the Inada conditions 
of the form 0
0
lim ( , ) /
L
f A L L
 
    .22 
Moreover, the land cultivated by any rural household remains unchanged during 
out-migration, that is, A=A0.23 At any time point, total labor services offered by 
household members are largely predetermined. The optimal agricultural labor input L 
may or may not be smaller than L0, depending on the concrete specification of rural 
labor markets.24 This section focuses on problem 3.1 in which rural household’s 
income-maximization problem is not constrained by its labor endowment. 
The model further that the wage rates faced by all rural workers when they were 
employed in the urban non-agricultural sector are given exogenously by a constant w1. 
It follows from the succinct assumption introduced in Chapter 2 that equally skilled 
rural workers face the same wage rate in urban sector, along with the presumption that 
throughout this chapter all rural workers are homogeneous and hence equally skilled. 
 
                                               
22 Indirect evidences on the prevalence of the partial migration in the Chinese context are provided in 
Appendix B. 
23 This assumption is relevant for rural China nowadays. Several empirical studies point out that the 
land market in rural China is still underdeveloped. According to Jin and Deininger (2004), in the period 
of 1995-2000, only 5.4 percent of rural households in their sample obtained additional land through 
official land redistribution. Around 10 percent of rural households participated in land rental market. Ye 
et al. (2005) shows that in their sample collected in 17 provinces in 2005, 81.8 percent of households 
did not obtain any land from other households. 
24 To my knowledge, there is no survey on the development of the Chinese rural labor market that is 
comparable to that given by Jin and Deininger (2004). Instead, in Chinese literature, the development 
of rural labor market is often evaluated indirectly by percentages of out-migration and non-farm 
activities among rural residents, rate of return to schooling, etc. Therefore, it would be impossible to 
decide precisely the relevance of the unconstrained and constrained maximization problems. As a 
response, I discuss in this chapter both problems, though admittedly, emphasis is put on the constrained 
maximization problem that could be of greater relevance when rural labor market is less developed in 
the sense that rural households have to rely heavily on labor services of their own members. In 
subsequent chapters, however, I will consider the constrained maximization problems only. 
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Solving problem 3.1 gives the first-order condition as follows 
 
0
1( , ) /f A L L w   , (3.1) 
which suggests that in the unconstrained optimum, the marginal product of labor in 
agriculture evaluating at (A0, L*) equals to the given urban wage rate w1. 
Thanks to the linearly homogeneity of agricultural technology, the first-order 
condition given by equation (3.1) can be written in a more compact form such that 
 
0
1( ) ( ,1) / ,  /MPL a f a L w with a A L     . (3.2) 
The existence and uniqueness of a finite solution *a  to equation (3.2) are 
guaranteed by properties of the marginal-product-of-labor function MPL(a), namely 
MPL(a) is increasing in a  and 1lim ( )
a
MPL a w

 , which is a consequence of the 
Inada conditions. The unconstrained optimal land-labor ratio is given by * 0 */a A L . 
At rural community level, suppose further that all households have the identical 
access to the production technology, the log ( )MPL a -loci and thus their intersections 
with 1log w -line must be the same. Moreover, it is common that initial land-labor 
ratios vary among rural households and thus they can be represented by a random 
variable with non-degenerate distribution. The first-order condition given by equation 
(3.2) describes the optimal plans of out-migration for rural households: all rural 
households, regardless of their initial land-labor ratios will adjust agricultural labor 
inputs until the marginal products of labor in agriculture equal to the given urban 
wage. However, in achieving the optimum, households whose initial land-labor ratios 
0a  are smaller than *a  rent part of their members’ labor services to urban employers 
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or to other rural households at the given urban wage rate. By contrast, households 
whose initial land-labor ratios 0a  are greater than *a  hire labor services from other 
rural households at the given urban wage rate. 
Consequently, as Figure 3.1 shows, all rural households will end up with the 
same land-labor ratio *a  and log marginal products of labor * 1log ( ) logMPL a w . 
 
Figure 3.1: The Unconstrained Maximum 
In the present setting, the impacts that out-migration has on rural inequality can 
be easily determined: As long as the initial distribution of land-labor ratios among 
rural households is non-degenerate, the pre-migratory rural inequality exceeds the 
post-migratory one. In other words, if problem 3.1 is the right problem to be 
maximized, then out-migration tends to reduce the rural inequality to zero. Note that 
so far the analysis does not resort to the joint normality assumption maintained by the 
standard Roy model. 
3.2 The Constrained Maximization Problem 
In developing countries like China, rural labor markets are often less complete than 
that presumed in Section 3.1. In particular, rural households have often limited 
accesses to these markets so that agricultural production undertaken by them has to 
a* 
logMPL0 
logw1 
a 
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rely on services provided by their members. For a polar case considered hereafter, 
rural households use exclusively services of their members. Hence, the predetermined 
0L  serve as upper bounds for households’ agricultural labor inputs and households’ 
pursuits of maximum income are constrained by labor endowments. Notice that such 
assumption is not unique in my thesis. It is shared in fact by many researches in a 
large literature originating from Chayanov (1966) and known now as the Agricultural 
Household Models. 
Therefore, rural households’ income-maximization problem subjective to the 
constraint of labor endowment 0L L  can be formulized as follows 
 
0 0
1
0
max ( , ) ( ),
. . .
L
f A L w L L
s t L L
 

 (Problem 3.2) 
Henceforth, problem 3.2 is called as the household’s constrained maximization 
problem. Note also that for this problem, the optimal agricultural labor input should 
be strictly positive, which is guaranteed by one of the Inada conditions. In this regard, 
all out-migrations considered in the present setting are partial out-migrations. 
Solving problem 3.2 gives a set of the first-order conditions such that 
 
0
1
0 0
1
0
(i)    ( , ) / 0;
(ii)  [ ( , ) / ]( ) 0;
(iii)  .
f A L L w
f A L L w L L
L L
   
    

 (3.3) 
Solution to the first-order conditions is denoted by #L . Note that throughout this 
thesis, the superscript # is reserved for the constrained maxima, while superscripts  0  
and  *  are reserved for the initial values and unconstrained maxima. 
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After rearrangements, the first-order conditions can be rewritten as 
  
0 0
# 1
0
1 1
log ,   log log ;
log
log ,         log log ,
MPL if MPL w
MPL
w if MPL w
 
 

 (3.4) 
or equivalently, 
 
# 0
1log max{log , log }MPL MPL w .  (3.5) 
Interestingly, equation (3.5) obtaining by solving rural households’ constrained 
maximization problem takes a similar form to equation (2.2), which is an a priori 
assumption of the standard Roy model that has a strong individualistic flavor. The 
close resemblance of both equations suggests the possibility of combining the micro- 
economic constrained maximization model with the statistical assumptions of the 
standard Roy model. It suggests further possibility of employing the extended Roy 
model as framework to quantify the impact of out-migration on rural inequality. 
In literature, the impact is usually captured by the difference of the pre- and post- 
migratory rural inequalities. More specifically, the pre-migratory rural inequality can 
be measured by 0(log )Var MPL , while the post-migratory rural inequality can be 
measured by #(log )Var MPL  instead of the truncated variance used in the standard 
Roy model, i.e. 0 0 1(log | log log )Var MPL MPL w . 
#(log )Var MPL  is likely to be 
the right choice because under the Inada conditions all rural households are still 
engaged at least partially in agricultural production after migration. As a result, the 
agricultural wages, i.e. shorthand for the marginal products of labor in agriculture 
earned by partially migratory households continue to contribute to the distribution of 
agricultural wages among rural households and hence to the post-migratory overall 
inequality in rural communities. As suggested by the law of total variance of the form 
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# # #(log ) [ (log | )] [ (log | )]I IVar MPL E Var MPL I Var E MPL I  , where the event of 
out-migration is captured by 0 11{log log }I MPL w  , 
#(log )Var MPL  takes fully 
account of the influences of agricultural wages earned by migratory households on the 
total inequality and thus should be preferred. 
Before quantifying the impact of out-migration on rural inequality by introducing 
the joint normality assumption of the standard Roy model, I would like to highlight 
the differences between the model developed in this section and the standard Roy 
model. At a higher level of abstraction, both models differ in one fundamental way, 
namely they associate with two interrelated but different statistical problems. Using 
the terminologies of statistics and econometrics, out-migrations in the first model 
result in censoring, while out-migrations in the second model result in truncation on 
the underlying distribution of log agricultural wages among households.25 To be 
concrete, in the first model, owing to the partial feature of out-migration, the 
post-migratory distribution of agricultural wages can be obtained by combining (i) a 
continuous distribution above the level of 1log w  with unchanged probability density 
function and (ii) a discrete distribution at the level of 1log w  with a usually positive 
probability 0 1Pr{log log }MPL w . By contrast, in the standard Roy model, since 
wages earned by migratory agents do not affect the wage distribution in the source 
sector, the post-migratory wage distribution can be obtained by adjusting underlying 
wage distribution relating to staying agents upwards. The censored and truncated 
variances #(log )Var MPL , 0 0 1(log | log log )Var MPL MPL w  measure the levels of 
inequality of two distributions mentioned above. 
                                               
25 For details on concepts of censoring and truncation, moments of the censored and truncated normal 
distribution, reader may refer to Greene (2007), Chapter 24. 
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Figure 3.2: Truncation versus Censoring 
Note that the thick lines in Panel A suggest that the probability density functions associating with 
staying households have been scaled up so that they integrate to one. The solid dots in Panel B suggest 
that the probabilities associating with them are often strictly positive and equal to the population share 
of migratory households in the rural community of interest. 
By asserting that 0log MPL  among different rural households is independently, 
identically and normally distributed such as 
 
. . .
0 2
0 0log ~ ( , )
i i d
MPL N   , (3.6) 
the microeconomic model developed in this section can be combined with the 
analytically convenient distributional assumption maintained by the standard Roy 
model. The rest of this section uses the resulted extended Roy model to address 
questions concerning the impacts of out-migration on income distribution in rural 
regions both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Together with other assumptions including the first-order condition given by 
equation (3.5) and 1log w const , the changes of mean log agricultural wages (
#E ) 
and of rural inequality ( #V ) can be formulized as follows:26 
                                               
26 Equations (3.7) and (3.8) follow directly from Theorem 24.3 in Greene (2007). 
logw1 
Panel A: Truncation Panel B: Censoring 
a* 
logw1 
logMPL0 
a* 
logMPL0 
a a 
 24 
 
 
0# #
0
0
(log ) (log )
[ ( ) ( )]
( );
E E MPL E MPL
c c c
J c
 

  
  
  
(3.7) 
 
# # 0
2 2
0
2
0
(log ) (log )
{(1 ( ))[(1 ( )) ( )( ( )) ] 1}
( ),
V Var MPL Var MPL
c c c c c
K c
  

  
     
  
(3.8) 
where c denotes the standardized wage gap defined as 1 0 0(log ) /c w    ; (.)  
and (.)  denote the cumulative and probability density functions of a standard 
normal distribution. (.)  is the Inverse Mills ratio defined as (.) (.) / (1 (.))    
and (.) '(.)  . 
The signs of ( )J c  in equation (3.7) and ( )K c  in equation (3.8) are difficult to 
be determined analytically. Instead, they are determined by using numerical evidences 
summarized in graphical form. Panel A of Figure 3.3 shows that for a wide range of c, 
( )J c  and # 0 0( )E J c   , which means out-migration tends to increase the mean 
of log agricultural wages earned by households in rural regions. More importantly, 
Panel B shows that for a wide range of c, ( )K c  and # 20 0( )V K c   , which 
means out-migration tends to decrease rural inequality. Therefore, qualitatively 
speaking, the extended Roy model gives the same prediction on the impacts that 
out-migration has on rural inequality as that given by the standard Roy model. 
Nevertheless, the difference in statistical problems of two models does lead to 
quantitatively different predictions on the impacts of out-migration on rural income 
distribution. To see this, I compare the means and variances of the truncated and 
censored normal distributions. Holding other things constant, the differences between 
the truncated and censored moments are #(log ) (log )DE E MPL E MPL   and 
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#(log ) (log ),DV Var MPL Var MPL   where log MPL  denotes the truncated log 
agricultural wage such that 0 0 1log log ,   log log .MPL MPL if MPL w
    Henceforth, 
(log )E MPL  and (log )Var MPL  denote truncated mean and variance. 
After some rearrangements, we have 
 1(log ) ( (log ))DE w E MPL
  . (3.9) 
Since (.)  is increasing and 1log (log )w E MPL
 , otherwise members of non- 
migratory households would migrate, we know 0DE  . This result suggests that in 
comparison with the standard Roy model, the extended Roy model predicts a smaller 
increase in mean log agricultural wages resulting from out-migration. 
Likewise, we have also27 
 
2 2
0
2
0
( ){[1 ( )][ ( )] [1 ( )]}
( ) ( ).
DV c c c c c
c L c
  

     
 
 (3.10) 
Since both 20  and ( )c  are positive, the sign of DV  depends on the sign of 
( )L c . According to Panel C of Figure 3.3, the sign of ( )L c  could be either positive 
or negative. Particularly, ( )L c  oscillates violently around ( ) 0L c   for large and 
positive c . Nevertheless, for the majority cases of interest, say 4c  ,28 it is safe to 
conclude that ( ) 0L c   and hence 0DV  . This result suggests that holding other 
things equal, the extended Roy model predicts a smaller decrease in rural inequality 
than the standard Roy model does. Panel D of Figure 3.3 provides further supportive 
                                               
27 Equation (3.10) follows directly from Theorems 24.2 and 24.3 in Greene (2007). 
28 Note that for the standard normally distributed random variable z~N(0,1), we have Pr(z>4)=0.0000, 
which means {z>4} is an event that almost never happens. 
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numerical evidences on the magnitudes of truncated and censored variances relative to 
the variance of underlying distribution. 
 
Panel A: J(c)                                  Panel B: K(c) 
 
Panel C: L(c)                            Panel D: M(c) and N(c) 
 
Figure 3.3: Numerical Evidences on the Truncated and Censored Moments 
Note that in Panel D M(c) is defined as 2
0
( ) (log ) /M c Var MPL   and is illustrated by dashed curve; 
N(c) is defined as # 2
0
( ) (log ) /N c Var MPL   and is illustrated by solid curve. Definitions for J(c), 
K(c) and L(c) can be found in equations (3.7), (3.8) and (3.10). Software: Stata 12.0. 
 
Until now, no attempt has been made to identify the source of rural inequality. In 
what follows, I return to this issue briefly. Following the suggestion in Section 2.2, I 
expand 0log MPL  around some a  as the following first-order Taylor’s series 
 
0
0
0
log ( )
log ( ) log ( ) log( ).
log
d MPL a a
MPL a MPL a
d a a
   (3.11) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
J(
c)
-10 -5 0 5 10
c
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
K
(c
)
-10 -5 0 5 10
c
-5
0
0
50
10
0
L(
c)
-10 -5 0 5 10
c
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
M
(c
),
 N
(c
)
-4 -2 0 2 4
c
 27 
 
If a  is chosen so that 0 log ( )MPL a  , then equation (3.11) can be rewritten 
in a form closely related to the wage decomposition formulas in Chapter 2 such that 
 0 0 0log ,h hMPL     (3.12) 
where the demeaned error term 0h  can be approximated by 
 
0 0
0 0 0
log ( )
log( ) log( ).
log
h h
h h
h
a ad MPL a
k
d a a a
        (3.13) 
This decomposition clarifies to a certain extent the source of pre-migratory rural 
inequality. According to equation (3.13), the rural wage inequality can be attributed to 
the inequality of land distribution among rural households. Such understanding is still 
incomplete, but it would be superior to the conventional practice to attribute all wage 
inequality indifferently to the heterogeneity of vaguely defined skills. Nevertheless, it 
must be admitted that the source of rural inequality plays only a minor if not no role in 
determining the impacts of out-migration on rural income distribution, as long as the 
distribution of underlying sectoral wages are assumed to be jointly normal. 
Careful readers may have noticed that up to this point, the analysis concerns 
primarily with how out-migration affects wage inequality among different households. 
However, the existing literature emphasizes more on the wage inequality among 
different individual workers. Thus, I will adapt previous discussions for the latter 
question. As will be clear soon, such extension is possible mainly because household’s 
income-maximization has already implied wage-maximization of its members, as long 
as the externalities of some household members’ out-migration on others members’ 
agricultural wages are taken into account. 
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One way to justify such extension can be illustrated as follows: We may think the 
whole process of labor reallocation made by a rural household whose 0 *a a  as a 
series of small adjustments.29 At the very beginning of this process, the revenue from 
reallocating the marginal unit of labor input away from agriculture is given by the 
urban wage 1w , while the cost equals to the loss caused by withdrawal of this unit of 
labor input from agricultural production, i.e. 0( )MPL a . Since 01 ( )w MPL a , it is in 
the best interest of both income-maximizing household and wage-maximizing worker 
as labor supplier to reallocate this unit of labor input away from agriculture. In fact, 
once the land-labor ratio faced by this household and all its members is given, 
external observers cannot separate two maximization problems pursued by different 
agents from one another. Similarly, for the rest of household agricultural labor inputs, 
income-maximizing household will decide in sequence whether they should be 
reallocated by comparing the revenues with costs evaluating at the constantly 
updating ratio between land and labor services of staying members. The reallocation 
will stop only when the cost of small adjustment catches up with its revenue.  
Note particularly that for already reallocated labor inputs, they receive incomes 
exclusively in the form of urban non-agricultural wages. Hence, it makes no sense to 
consider the agricultural wages earned by them, though both wages equalize at the 
margin. To avoid such ambiguity, a new notation w is introduced to denote the 
post-migratory wage rates received by all labor inputs offered by members of rural 
households. According to the discussions above, for each unit of the labor inputs (  ), 
the wage rate it receives takes the form of  0 1log max{log , log },  w MPL w    . 
                                               
29 The dynamic adjustments are not compatible to the static framework in this chapter in strict sense. 
Nevertheless, these adjustments provide justification for the solution to the static optimization problem. 
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If an individual worker is viewed as supplier of a bundle of units of labor inputs, 
then the equation above can be also applied approximately to capture the log post- 
migratory wages earned by individual workers such that 
  0 1log max{log , log },  i iw MPL w i  . (3.14) 
This equation takes a similar form as that of equation (3.5). Moreover, as 
explained above, both equations are also related through their economic meanings. 
Therefore, equation (3.14) can be seen as a straightforward extension of equation (3.5) 
at the level of individual workers. 
Suppose that migratory and staying workers belonging to the same households 
relate closely through income pooling, we need to consider not only the agricultural 
wages earned by staying workers, but also the urban wages earned by migratory 
workers in determining the level and change of wage inequality among individual 
workers. Consequently, setting aside the complex issues such as redistribution within 
household, the post-migratory distribution of wages of individual workers can be 
obtained by censoring the underlying distribution at the urban wage rate. 
Suppose further that the distribution of 0log MPL  among individual workers is 
also normal, together with the assumption 1log w const  and equation (3.14), the 
post-migratory individual wage inequality must be smaller than its original level, that 
is,  0(log ) (log )Var w Var MPL . In other words, out-migration tends to decrease the 
wage inequality among these individual workers as well. 
This result turns out to be robust. In fact, it holds even when the distribution of 
0log MPL  is not normal, while other specifications, especially 1log w const  keep 
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unchanged.30,31 The intuition behind is straightforward: According to the law of total 
variance, the overall wage inequality can be decomposed into weighted within-group 
wage inequalities and between-group wage inequality. We can determine easily the 
directions of impacts of out-migration on each of these components of decomposition. 
Previous discussions suggest that (1) out-migration tends to decrease the wage 
inequality within the group of migratory agents, since all migratory households and 
workers end up with earning the same wage rate 1w ; (2) out-migration has no impact 
on the wage inequality within the group of staying households. Moreover, if 
agricultural wages earned by workers are evaluating using the constantly updating 
land-labor ratios, then out-migration has no impact on the wage inequality within the 
group of staying workers, either; (3) meanwhile, out-migration tends to narrow the 
average wage gap between migratory and staying households as well as that between 
both groups of workers. Therefore, the overall impact of out-migration is to decrease 
the rural inequality. The reasoning above requires no normality of 0log MPL . 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 This is generally not the case for truncation. Heckman and Honoré (1990) show that to ensure that 
truncation results in lower variance, the original distribution has to be log-concave. Normal distribution 
is one of the log-concave distributions. 
31 Similar reasoning can be used to deal with the impacts of out-migration on the rural inequality 
defined over alternative incomes such as the average products of labor in agriculture or per capita 
household income. It turns out that for rural inequalities defined using all income concepts above, out- 
migration tends to reduce the rural inequality. This alternative approach has the virtual that it does not 
rely on strong distributional assumption. Nevertheless, it offers only qualitative predictions on the 
change of rural inequality in the course of out-migration. Moreover, this approach is not readily to be 
extended to consider problems with heterogeneous labor. 
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3.3 Necessity of Allowing for the Labor Heterogeneity 
Although substantial efforts have been made in this chapter to extend the standard 
Roy model and then to use the extended Roy model to study the impacts that out- 
migration has on inequality, two inconsistencies pointed out in Chapter 2 cannot be 
satisfactorily reconciled. According to equation (5.38), just like the standard Roy 
model, the extended Roy model also predicts that out-migration decreases rural 
inequality and it leaves still no room for changes of rural inequality in other directions. 
The only notable difference between two models lies in that the extended model 
predicts a smaller decrease in rural inequality resulted from out-migration than the 
standard model does (see equation 3.10 and Figure 3.3, Panel C). 
Discussions in this chapter have shown also that the prediction that out-migration 
always decrease the rural inequality is very robust. It applies to rural inequalities 
defined among rural households and among workers. Moreover, it applies to cases 
where 0log MPL  is normally distributed and where it is not. The robustness seems so 
impressive that some doubts need to be cast on it. One may suspect whether the 
robustness is derived mostly from some overly strong assumptions that has been 
imposed, for instance, the succinct assumption 1log w const . As suggested by the 
analysis without assuming the normality, by adopting that succinct assumption the 
wage distribution of migratory agents is squeezed into a constant, which could explain 
to a certain extent to the decrease of overall rural inequality. As a response, that 
assumption will be relaxed in subsequent discussions and the distribution of 1log w  
will be non-degenerate. Given that throughout the theoretical exploration, I stick to 
the assumption introduced in Chapter 2, namely equally skilled rural workers face 
with the same urban wage rate, relaxation of that assumption would require some kind 
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of heterogeneity of skills among individual workers and their households. This serves 
as a major motivation for introducing the labor heterogeneity into theoretical analyses 
in next two chapters. 
There is also a minor motivation for introducing of the labor heterogeneity. As 
readers may have seen, in previous discussions on the level and change of rural 
inequality among individual workers, these workers’ agricultural wages relate not 
only to the agricultural technology, urban wage and their households’ initial land- 
labor ratios 0a , but also to their sequence of migration within households. However, 
since in the present setting, all rural workers are by assumption homogeneous and 
little is known about whether all household members have the same access to the land, 
there exists no sound explanation for such sequence. Allowing the rural workers to be 
heterogeneous and hence to have different relative advantages in both sectors could 
help understand that sequence. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACTS OF OUT-MIGRATION: THE MODEL WITH 
HETEROGENEOUS AND PERFECTLY SUBSTITUTIVE LABOR 
In the next two chapters, I continue the theoretical exploration of the impacts that out- 
migration has on income distribution in rural regions. A significant departure from 
Chapter 3 is that rural workers are now assumed to be heterogeneous in earning 
capacity. As will be shown later on, introducing of the labor heterogeneity 
complicates the exploration greatly so that it is not always possible to obtain 
unambiguous predictions. Nevertheless, the theoretical exploration below deepens our 
understanding on the impacts of out-migration on rural inequality. Furthermore, it 
points out the limitation of the Roy models in general, especially when they are 
applied to the settings with imperfect labor substitution. 
4.1 Model Setup 
To begin with, I list and discuss briefly the assumptions essential for the following 
two chapters. These assumptions can be sorted into three groups. 
4.1.1 The Agricultural Technology 
The first challenge is to find a proper way of modeling the labor heterogeneity 
among different types of rural workers and labor services. This decision could affect 
the subsequent exploration. 
This thesis employs the nested CES framework to model the labor heterogeneity. 
Within that framework, different types of labor inputs, together with non-labor inputs 
are organized by a production function in the nested CES form according to the ease 
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of substitution. This choice relates to two literatures. The first literature adopts the 
multi-level nested CES as the empirical specification to study the impacts of 
immigration on the destination (See Borjas, 2003, Ottaviano and Peri, 2008, 2012)32. 
The second literature emphasizes the role of imperfect substitution in determining the 
changes of wage structure and inequality (See Katz and Murphy, 1992; Katz and 
Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002). 
Following both literatures, the model assumes that all households in the rural 
community of interest have accesses to the same two-level nested CES production 
technology given below: At the higher level of the nested CES function, land (A) and 
effective labor (QL) inputs are combined by a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the 
final agricultural output (y) such that 
 
1y TA QL  ,  (4.1) 
where T denotes the hicksian technical factor. At the lower level of this nested CES 
function, the effective labor input is in turn the outcome of a CES function combining 
different types of agricultural labor inputs.33 Mainly for the analytical convenience it 
brings with, this model assumes further continuum types of labor inputs,34 each of 
                                               
32 The methodological innovation is primarily made in Card and Lemieux (2001). 
33 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is often criticized for it imposes overly strong restrictions on the 
technology. In particular, under the Cobb-Douglas, the elasticity of substitution among inputs must be 
unity. Nevertheless, in the literature that uses the nested CES specification as its empirical framework, 
the Cobb-Douglas form is the leading specification for the highest level of the nesting structure. 
Moreover, throughout Chapters 4 and 5, I assume that at the lower level of the nesting structure, all 
types of labor inputs enter the CES function symmetrically – There is no one labor type that can be 
separated from other labor types. The symmetric CES specification is also restrictive, since it requires 
the elasticities of substitution are the same for any pair of labor types. This shortcoming does not affect 
much the popularity of such a specification in theoretical and empirical studies, partly because it offers 
a simple and manageable way to incorporate both the labor heterogeneity and imperfect substitution 
among labor inputs into the analysis. 
34 It may seem at odd to assume continuum of labor types in the context of household farm, since (1) 
the average size of workforce in household farms is often small and (2) skills of different household 
members are often highly correlated. A rationale might be used in justifying this assumption is that skill 
level of workers relate not only to the largely fixed characteristics, such as education, age, gender etc., 
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which is indexed with a one-dimensional skill level in the range of [0,1]s . Hence, 
the effective labor input takes the form of 
 
1 1/
0
[ ( ) ( ) ]QL q s L s ds   , (4.2) 
where ( )L s  denotes the amount of agricultural labor input with skill s, ( )q s  can be 
loosely interpreted as the quality of ( )L s .35 The parameter   relates closely to the 
elasticity of substitution among all types of labor inputs denoting by 1/ (1 )E   . 
To ensure rural households’ optimization problem is well defined, it is often 
assumed that 1  .36 For the purpose of this thesis, however, we need to assume 
further that 0  . In literature, 0   corresponds to the probably more relevant 
cases in which the skill biased technical change raises the skill premium. 
Note that among all admissible values of  , a special case 1   deserves a 
separate treatment first, because it relates to an analytically simple and empirically 
relevant setting in which in spite of the differences in earning capacity, all types of 
labor inputs offered by rural workers are perfect substitutes in household agricultural 
production.37 In the present chapter, I focus on this specific setting and explore the 
                                                                                                                                      
but they may be also contingent on working conditions, such as season, weather and daily working 
hours. If these working conditions vary over a wide range continuously, the actual skill level may vary 
accordingly. 
35 For a detailed discussion on the economic interpretation of parameters {q(s)}, reader may see 
Appendix C. 
36  More explicitly, to ensure the income-maximizing problem is well defined, the production 
technology must be locally concave in the neighborhood of the optimal choice. The condition 1   
guarantees both local and global concavity of the CES technology. However, it becomes less clear 
whether the same condition applies to the more complicated nested CES technology. 
37 Admittedly, it seems difficult to find concrete examples in which different inputs (or consumption 
goods) are perfect substitutes in producing the final output (or utility). However, several empirical 
evidences do suggest the relevance of this setting. For example, in an empirical study using the firm- 
level microdata, Hellerstein et al. (1999) finds no evidence suggesting that workers with different 
characteristics are imperfect substitutes. In Chapter 6, I cannot reject the original hypothesis that rural 
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impacts of out-migration on rural inequality. Some preliminary discussions on more 
general setting with the parameter 0 1  , in which agricultural labor inputs are 
heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutive in household agricultural production will 
be delayed until the next chapter. 
4.1.2 The Urban Sector 
The model adopts again the succinct specification for the urban non-agricultural 
sector, namely rural workers are price-takers in that sector: All rural workers endowed 
with skill level s face the exogenously given urban wage rate ( )w s . 
4.1.3 The Factor Markets in Rural Regions 
Similar to Chapter 3, this chapter assumes the land cultivated by each rural 
household keeps unchanged during migration, i.e. 0A A . At any point of time, 
household’s labor endowments 0{ ( )}L s  are largely predetermined: They depend on 
both the quantity and quality of labor services offered by their members. Suppose that 
the rural labor market works perfectly, individual households’ decisions are unaffected 
by their labor endowments. By contrast, suppose the rural labor market works less 
perfectly, which is often the case for developing countries like China, households’ 
decisions are likely to be constrained by their labor endowments. For all discussions 
below, I will focus on a setting with imperfect rural labor markets and thus households’ 
constrained maximization problem. Such choice can be partly justified by its higher 
relevance to the developing countries. Equally important, as demonstrated in Chapter 
3, this choice can be further justified by the larger potential that the constrained 
                                                                                                                                      
workers belonging to different education-age cells are perfect substitutes in household agricultural 
production at 5% significance level. These empirical findings might suggest that the imperfect 
substitution may be only of importance outside individual economic agents. 
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maximization problem has to combine with the joint normality assumption of the 
standard Roy model. 
4.2 The Constrained Maximization Problem 
Under all assumptions listed above, the constrained maximization problem faced by 
any rural household takes the form of 
 
1 10 1 0
10 0{ ( )}
0
0 0
1
max ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( ), [0,1]
,{ ( )}
{ ( )}
L s
T A q s L s ds w s L s L s ds
s.t.   L s L s s
where A L s  are predetermined;
and w s  are exogeneously given.
   
  
 
 (Problem 4.1) 
Note that the nested CES specification used in problem 4.1 requires the effective 
agricultural labor input in the constrained optimum, i.e. 
1# #
0
( ) ( )QL q s L s ds   to be 
strictly positive. However, since all types of labor inputs are by assumption perfect 
substitutes, some of them may take zero values in the constrained optimum, which 
means that labor services at these skill levels can be completely reallocated away from 
household agriculture.38 
Solving the constrained maximization problem gives a set of the complimentary- 
slackness conditions as follows: 
 
1
0
1
0
1
log ( ,...) log ( ) ( ) 0;
log ( ,...) log ( ) ( ) ( );
log ( ,...) log ( ) ( ) ( ).
MPL s w s L s
MPL s w s L s L s
MPL s w s L s L s
  
   
     
(4.3) 
By taking partial derivatives and natural logarithms, we obtain the formula for 
                                               
38 Another possibility is that L0(s) = 0 for some s. For the discussion in this chapter, the existence of 
some zero skill-specific labor inputs cause no particular problem. 
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the log agricultural wage rate earned by a marginal worker at skill level s in the rural 
household such that 
 
log ( ,...) log ( ) log ,MPL s T s a 
 
(4.4) 
where the technical term ( ) (1 ) ( )T s q s T   and household’s effective land-labor 
ratio a is defined as 
10
0
/ ( ) ( )a A q s L s ds  . 
Hence, the pre- and post-migratory log agricultural wages can be obtained by 
evaluating equation (4.4) using the pre-migratory and constrained optimal land-labor 
ratios, namely 0a a
 
and #a a . 
 
0 0log ( ,...) log ( ) log ;MPL s T s a 
 
(4.5) 
 
# #log ( ,...) log ( ) log .MPL s T s a 
 
(4.6) 
The difference between them is captured by   defined as 
 
# 0
# 0
log ( ,...) log ( ,...)
(log log ).
MPL s MPL s
a a


 
   
(4.7) 
The additional term   measures the effects that out-migration has on household 
farm’s effective land-labor ratio and thus on the log agricultural wages earned by 
staying members. Moreover,   summarizes all corrections to be made upon the 
pre-migratory log agricultural wage 0log ( ,...)MPL s  to get the true reservation wage 
of out-migration defining as 
 
0
#
log ( ,...) log ( ,...)
log ( ,...).
rw s MPL s
MPL s
 

 (4.8) 
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Considering that in the constrained optimum, certain types of rural workers and 
their services can be completely reallocated from agriculture to urban sector, these 
workers earn no longer agricultural wages. Thus, analogous to Chapter 3, a new 
notation log ( ,...)w s  is introduced to denote the post-migratory log wage rate earned 
by marginal workers at skill level s in the household of interest, regardless of the 
sector where they are employed. 
With the help of notations log ( ,...)w s  and log ( ,...)rw s , the complimentary- 
slackness conditions given by equation (4.3) can be rewritten elegantly as 
 

1
0
log ( ,...) max{log ( ,...), log ( )},  ,
 log ( ,...) log ( ,...) .
r
r
w s w s w s s
where w s MPL s 
 
 
 (4.9) 
As readers may have noticed, equation (4.9) resembles to equation (3.5), except 
that in the presence of labor heterogeneity the log reservation wage log ( ,...)rw s  
deviates from pre-migratory log agricultural wage 0log ( ,...)MPL s  by the term  . 
Strictly speaking, all previous discussions deal with the determination of wages 
earned by the last units of labor services or marginal workers at different skill levels 
in household. These discussions may not be easily adapted for the wage determination 
for all units of labor services and rural workers, since even for those with the same 
skill, their agricultural wages differ. In fact, the agricultural wages earned by a 
marginal worker would be the lowest among all workers at his skill level, since 
out-migration of marginal workers tends to raise agricultural wages of non-marginal 
workers. Nevertheless, since the amounts of labor services and workers at each skill 
level in rural households are usually small, the agricultural wages earned by marginal 
workers offer good approximations to agricultural wages earned by non-marginal 
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workers at corresponding skill levels. In this regard, we have the approximate relation 
for all labor services and rural workers as follows: 
 

1
0
log max{log , log },  ,
 log log .
r
i i i
r
i i i
w w w i
where w MPL 
 
 
 (4.10) 
As will be shown below,   is of importance for the subsequent exploration, yet 
its functional form remains unknown. Thus, before proceeding I take a moment to 
address this issue briefly. 
According to its definition given by equation (4.7), the functional form of   
relies on the unknown constrained optimal household’s effective land-labor ratio #a , 
which relies in turn on the values of constrained optimal labor inputs #{ ( )}L s . 
As suggested by the complimentary-slackness conditions given by equation (4.3), 
the values of #{ ( )}L s  are determined by comparisons between #log ( ,...)MPL s  and 
1log ( )w s . To simplify the discussion, it is assumed that the loci of 
#log ( ,...)MPL s  
and 1log ( )w s  are increasing in s, and the 1log ( )w s -locus intersects only once at 
s s   with #log ( ,...)MPL s -locus from below.39 
Under these two assumptions, the continuum of skill [0,1]  is divided into three 
intervals: On the left of s s  , since # 1log ( ,...) log ( )MPL s w s , the complimentary- 
slackness condition predicts that # 0( ) ( )L s L s ; At the point of s s   where both loci 
intersect, the condition predicts that # 00 ( ) ( )L s L s  ; while on the right of s s  , 
                                               
39 Both assumptions are likely to be fact-based. The first assumption can be restated as the rate of 
return to skill in both sectors are positive, while the second assumption is inevitable, given the first 
assumption and the observation that a large fraction of out-migrations are usually partial and selective. 
These assumptions simplify the discussion mostly because by imposing them, the probability that a 
type of labor input being partially migratory can be ignored. 
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since # 1log ( ,...) log ( )MPL s w s , the condition predicts that 
# ( ) 0L s  . Therefore, 
after taking logarithms, the definition of #a  can be rearranged as follows: 
 
1# 0 #
0
0 0
0
log log log ( ) ( )
= log log ( ) ( ) .
s
a A q s L s ds
A q s L s ds
 



  (4.11) 
Besides, the fact that #log ( ,...)MPL s  and 1log ( )w s  intersect at s s   implies 
 
#
1log ( ) log log ( ).T s a w s    (4.12) 
The solution to the system of equations (4.11) and (4.12) is #(log , ).a s  
Unfortunately, even in this simplified setting, we can only obtain an implicit 
solution to s  such that 
 
0 0
10
( ) log ( ) ( ) log ( ) log ( ) log 0,
s
G s q s L s ds w s T s A     
  
 (4.13) 
and thus an implicit solution to   of the form 
 
# 0[log ( ) log ].a s a    (4.14) 
4.3 Exploring the Impacts Using the Extended Roy Model 
Analogous to Chapter 3, this chapter builds an extended Roy model by combining 
household’s constrained income-maximization problem with two further assumptions, 
namely (1) all households in the community have same technical accesses, and (2) the 
log wages faced by rural workers in both sectors, i.e. 0 1(log , log )MPL w  are jointly 
normally distributed. Nevertheless, because of the existence of  , we cannot 
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determine the precise impacts of out-migration on rural inequality using the extended 
Roy model. 
There are two difficulties associating with the unknown term  : Firstly, since 
for all rural households, the values of   are always non-negative, the random 
variable   at community level cannot be normally distributed in any strict sense. 
Therefore, if the distribution of log sectoral wages 0 1(log , log )MPL w  is jointly 
normal, the distribution of 1(log , log )
rw w  is at best approximately jointly normal. 
Secondly, even if the distribution of 1(log , log )
rw w  is a reasonable approximation to 
a jointly normal distribution, it is still impossible to determine even qualitatively the 
impacts that out-migration has on rural inequality without knowing about the 
distributional properties of  , especially the covariance matrix of 0(log , )MPL  . 
To illustrate the second difficulty and facilitate further exploration, I collect the 
key assumptions maintained by the extended Roy model as follows: 
(1) The distribution of log underlying sectoral wages 0 1(log , log )MPL w  faced 
by rural workers is jointly normal; The distribution of 1(log , log )
rw w  can be 
approximated by another jointly normal distribution such that 
 
. . .
' ' '
1 0 1 0 1 01(log , log ) ~ ( , , , , ).
i i d
rw w N       (4.15) 
(2) The log observed wage of any rural worker is given by equation (4.10) 
 

1
0
log max{log , log },
 log log .
r
r
w w w
where w MPL 

   
(3) This thesis concerns with the inequality of wages earned by workers who are 
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members of rural households. Thus, the pre-migratory inequality should be 
measured by 0(log )Var MPL , while the post-migratory inequality should be 
measured by (log )Var w , which is the variance of a distribution obtaining by 
censoring the distribution of log rw  at corresponding 1log w . 
Having had all three assumptions, as will be shown in the remainder of this 
section, we may be able to determine the relative magnitudes of the pre-censored and 
censored variances, i.e. (log )rVar w  and (log )Var w . Unluckily, since the pre- 
censored and pre-migratory variances, i.e. (log )rVar w  and 0(log )Var MPL  take 
usually different values in the sense that 
 
0
0 0
(log ) (log )
(log ) ( ) 2 (log , ),
rVar w Var MPL
Var MPL Var Cov MPL

 
 
  
 (4.16) 
the lack of knowledge on   prevents us from determining the relative magnitudes of 
pre- and post-migratory variances, i.e. 0(log )Var MPL  and (log )Var w  and thus the 
direction of change of rural inequality resulting from out-migration. 
For the reason that the difficulties caused by   cannot be easily overcome, for 
the preliminary discussion below, I have no choice but to ignore  . Note that by 
ignoring  , the first category of intra-household economic linkages mentioned in 
Chapter 2 is excluded from subsequent discussions. The agricultural wages earned by 
staying workers are thus unaffected by out-migration. Nevertheless, I continue to 
emphasize the second category of linkages, namely the intra-household income 
pooling. The income pooling mechanism requires that the wages earned by migratory 
rural household members must be taken into account in determining the post- 
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migratory wage distribution and inequality. 
Once   is ignored, for any rural worker, his log reservation wage of out- 
migration log rw  equals to his log pre-migratory agricultural wage 0log MPL . For 
expository simplicity, I use 0log w  to denote 
0log MPL  below. Therefore, the three 
assumptions of the extended Roy model can be simplified as: 
(1’) The distribution of log underlying sectoral wages 0 1(log , log )w w  faced by 
all rural workers is jointly normal such that 
 
. . .
0 1 0 1 0 1 01(log , log ) ~ ( , , , , ).
i i d
w w N       (4.17) 
(2’) The log observed wage of any rural worker is given by 
  0 1log max{log , log }.w w w  (4.18) 
(3’) The post-migratory wage inequality is measured by (log )Var w . 
By comparing the assumptions of the standard and the simplified extended Roy 
models, it is found that both models are similar except for one notable distinction, 
namely, the post-migratory wage inequality in the extended Roy model is measured 
by the censored variance (log )Var w  instead of its truncated counterpart suggested 
by the standard Roy model, i.e. 0 0 1(log | log log )Var w w w . 
Given the three assumptions above, I attempt to determine the impacts that out- 
migration has on rural inequality. According to assumption (3’), such impacts could 
be determined by comparing the pre- and post-migratory wage inequalities, i.e. 
0(log )Var w  and 
(log )Var w . 
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By assumption, the pre-migratory wage inequality equals to 20 . Applying the 
law of total variance to the post-migratory wage inequality (log )Var w  yields: 
 
  
0
1
2
0 1
(log ) ( (log | )) ( (log | ))
[1 ( )] (log | 0)
( ) (log | 1)
( )[1 ( )]{[ (log | 0)] [ (log | 1)]} ,
I IVar w E Var w I Var E w I
                 c Var w I
                 c Var w I
                 c c E w I E w I
 
  
 
    
 
(4.19) 
where 0 11{log log }I w w   denotes the migration status of rural workers, c denotes 
the standardized intersectoral wage gap with 2 21 0 0 1 01 0 1( ) / 2c           , and 
( )c  denotes the population share of migratory rural workers. 
Substituting the expressions of truncated means and variances into equation (4.19) 
gives the formula below40 
 
 2 2 2 2
0 1
2
0 0 1 1
(log ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )]{[ ( )] [ ( )]} ,
Var w c c c c
                 c c c c
     
     
     
       
(4.20) 
where ( ),  ( )c c   are the inverse Mills ratio and its derivative with respect to c,   
and   are correlation coefficients defined as 2 201 1 0 0 1 01 0 1( ) / 2           
and 2 21 01 0 0 1 01 0 1( ) / 2            . 
As suggested by equation (4.20), the functional form of (log )Var w  is so 
complex that the impacts of out-migration on rural inequality may not be determined 
analytically. Therefore, for the rest of this section, graphics based on numerical 
evidences are used intensively to assist the exploration. To facilitate graphical 
presentations, the exploration below measures the distributional impacts using the 
                                               
40 See Appendix A for a discussion. 
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ratio (instead of difference) between (log )Var w  and 0(log )Var w . 
 

0
2 2 2
1 0
2
0 0 1 0 1 0
(log ) / (log )
[1 ( )][1 ( )] ( )( / ) [1 ( )]
( )[1 ( )]{[( / ) ( )] [( / ) ( / ) ( )]} ,
VR Var w Var w
    c c c c
    c c c c
     
       

     
       
(4.21) 
mainly because the ratio depends only on dimensionless parameters. To reduce the 
dimensionality, all parameters in equation (4.21) are expressed as combinations of 
four independent parameters 1 0 1 0 0 0 01{ / , / , / , }        such that
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 (4.22) 
Based on equations (4.21) and (4.22), I give some discussions on the following 
three questions about the redefined rural inequality and its changes during rural-to- 
urban migration. They are (1) whether out-migration always decreases rural inequality; 
(2) if the answer to the first question is negative, then under which conditions the rural 
inequality tends to decrease and increase; and (3) whether the pattern of migration 
selection and the (direction of) change of rural inequality are causally interrelated. 
Subsequent discussions are organized around these questions. 
Since VR  is a function of parameters 1 0 1 0 0 0 01{ / , / , / , }       , interactions 
among these parameters make it often difficult to approach these questions. Therefore, 
                                               
41 These four independent parameters form a basis, but the basis is by no means the only basis. 
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I isolate one parameter at a time, holding other parameters constant. In other words, I 
consider several simpler questions of comparative statics as intermediate steps. The 
discussion below pays particular attention on comparative statics of VR  with respect 
to 1 0/   and 1 0/  . 
Firstly, I provide evidences about comparative statics concerning 1 0/  . To 
visualize the evidences, specific values have to be assigned to parameters 1 0/   and 
0 0/   in advance. For example, Panel A of Figure 4.1 assumes that 1 0/ 1    so 
that the change of rural inequality caused by intersectoral wage gap can be eliminated 
and it assumes further that 0 0/ 10   , which is supported by empirics in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, another parameter 01  is controlled for explicitly in Panel A: Different 
curves in Panel A correspond to different values of 01 [ 1,1]   . These iso- 01  
curves are denoted henceforth by 1 0 01( / ; )VR    . 
In general, Panel A shows clearly that the values of VR  could be either smaller 
or larger than unity, which suggests that out-migration could decrease or increase the 
redefined rural inequality. Since the iso- 01  curves are usually increasing in 1 0/  , 
a rising rural inequality ( 1VR  ) requires “sufficiently” large 1 0/  , which depend 
in turn on values of other parameters. For instance, holding others constant, a 
“sufficiently” large 1 0/   tends to be smaller for cases in which 01  is positive 
and large than other cases where 01  is small or even negative in its value. 
 
Next, I provide evidences about comparative statics concerning 1 0/   when 
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1 0/   takes three somewhat representative values, namely 1 0/  = 0.5, 1 and 2. 
Again, I assume that 0 0/ 10   . 
Panels B, C and D of Figure 4.1 confirm that out-migration could either decrease 
or increase rural inequality. Furthermore, an increase in intersectoral wage gap 1 0/   
raises the overall rural inequality when 1 0/ 1    (See Panel D), but it is not the 
case when 1 0/ 1   . In particular, as illustrated in Panel B, if 1 0/ 1   , an 
increase in 1 0/   tends to decrease the overall rural inequality, that is, a sharp 
decrease followed by a mild increase in the overall rural inequality. 
 
            Panel A: 
1 0 0 0
/ 1,  / 10                       Panel B: 
1 0 0 0
/ 0.5,  / 10      
 
            Panel C: 
1 0 0 0
/ 1,  / 10                      Panel D: 
1 0 0 0
/ 2,  / 10      
Figure 4.1: Comparative Statics of VR  with respect to 1 0/   and 1 0/   
In sum, all comparative statics in Figure 4.1 give a negative answer to the first 
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question: Under the new definition of rural inequality, out-migration could not only 
decrease, but increase rural inequality. As for the second question, though the 
graphical method provides insights into the conditions under which rural inequality 
could decrease or increase, this method may not suffice to determine these conditions 
precisely. Furthermore, even if we could determine them by applying this method 
repeatedly, it would be still difficult to identify underlying parameters in the 
conditions from the data and then to test these conditions against the data and facts. 
The difficulties in answering the second question lead to further exploration of 
the third question, because comparing to the change of rural inequality, we are usually 
more knowledgeable about the pattern of migration selection, and also because the 
identification of the pattern is usually more straightforward than that of the change of 
rural inequality.42 If the pattern of migration selection and the change of rural 
inequality are in fact interrelated, just as what Lipton (1980) and Li (2003) suggests, 
we can predict the change of rural inequality based on already known or relatively 
easily identified pattern of migration selection. 
Therefore, at the end of this section, I will explore in detail the relationships 
between the pattern of migration selection and (direction of) change of rural 
inequality using the analytical toolkit developed so far, which includes the formal 
definitions of key concepts and the graphic method based on numerical evidences. 
The following exploration provides also a re-evaluation of the well-known conjecture. 
 
By inspecting the conditions for different patterns of migration selection given 
                                               
42 This is mainly because the identification of the pattern of migration selection associates only with 
comparisons of conditional means (or expectations) of wages earned by different subgroups of rural 
workers. Most conventional regression techniques serve well for this purpose. 
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by equations (2.3) - (2.5) and the formula of VR  given by equations (4.21), (4.22), it 
is easy to find that all of them relate to parameters 1 0 1 0 0 0 01{ / , / , / , }       . This 
fact motivates the following exploration of the relationships between the pattern of 
migration selection and change of rural inequality. 
Nevertheless, since the conditions of migration selection contain only two of four 
parameters, i.e. 1 0/   and 01 , in general we cannot predict the change (direction 
and magnitude) of rural inequality precisely using the pattern of migration selection, 
unless we assign some specific values to free parameters, i.e. 1 0/   and 0 0/   that 
are excluded from the conditions for migration selection. Considering that the choice 
of free parameters could have some influences on results and there is no way to know 
these influences in advance, I will firstly explore the relationships of interest when 
1 0/   and 0 0/   are set to 1 and 10. Then I will check the robustness of the 
preliminary findings by assigning alternative values to these free parameters. 
Besides, in consistency with previous discussion, the graphic method is used as 
the tool for the exploration below. If the third question is reformulated in graphic 
terms, it reads as whether the values of VR  in sub-regions on the 1 0/  - VR  plane 
associating with one of the three patterns of migration selection differ considerably. 
To be more specific, I am particularly interested in whether some of these sub-regions 
lie entirely above or below the horizontal line 1VR   on the plane. For simplicity, x  
and   are used to denoted 1 0/   and 01 . 
I begin by considering cases in which out-migrations exhibit the positive sorting. 
With new notations, the sufficient and necessary conditions for positive sorting can be 
written as 1/ x   and 1x  . These conditions specify one of its boundaries that 
 51 
 
separates the sub-region in which migrations exhibit the positive sorting from other 
sub-regions on the x - VR  plane. To see why this is the case, we may think of 
examples with concrete numbers. For instance, when 1  , these conditions imply 
1/ 1x   , which means along the iso-  curve ( ; 1)VR x   , the section in which 
migrations exhibit the positive sorting must lie to the right of a threshold (1; 1)VR   ; 
Similarly, when 0.5  , we know that along the iso-  curve ( ; 0.5)VR x   , the 
section in which migrations exhibit the positive sorting must lie to the right of a 
threshold (2; 0.5)VR   , etc. Connecting these thresholds on all iso-  curves with 
positive   gives one of the boundaries of the sub-region within which migrations 
exhibit the positive sorting denoting by ( ; 1/ ),  1VR x x x   . Figure 4.2 suggests 
that this boundary is likely to be increasing in x. 
Another boundary for the same sub-region is often offered by the boundaries of 
feasible region, which is shorthand for all possible values of ( , )Vx R , given other 
parameters. For the special case presented in Figure 4.2 with 1 0/ 1   , the iso-   
curve ( ; 1)VR x    offers the upper boundary for the feasible region, and thus for the 
sub-region with the positive sorting.43 
The sub-region surrounded by the two boundaries, i.e. ( ; 1/ )VR x x   and 
( ; 1)VR x    consists of all cases in which out-migrations exhibit the positive sorting. 
 
                                               
43 For the special case in which 
1 0
/ 1   , we can prove ( ; )
V
R x   is increasing in  . Thus, 
( ; 1)
V
R x    offers an upper boundary of the feasible region, while ( ; 1)
V
R x     offers a lower 
boundary. 
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Likewise, I can show that the sub-region surrounded by another two boundaries, 
i.e. ( ; )VR x x   and ( ; 1)VR x     consists of all cases in which out- migrations 
exhibit the negative sorting. The rest of the feasible region consists of all cases in 
which migrations exhibit the non-hierarchical sorting. 
Furthermore, I find that the boundaries defined by the conditions for the positive 
and the negative sorting as well as the iso-  curve ( ; 1)VR x    intersect at the 
point (1,1) . According to Figure 4.2, all of these curves are likely to be increasing in 
x. Therefore, the sub-region in which migrations exhibit the positive sorting lies 
entirely above the line 1VR  ; the sub-region in which migrations exhibit the 
negative sorting lies entirely below the line 1VR  ; while the sub-region in which 
migrations exhibit the non-hierarchical sorting lies on the both sides of 1VR  . These 
findings of the graphic analysis imply that migrations exhibiting the positive sorting 
tend to coexist with increasing rural inequality; migrations exhibiting the negative 
sorting tend to coexist with decreasing rural inequality, while the relationship between 
migrations exhibiting the non-hierarchical sorting and the direction of change of rural 
inequality is underdetermined. 
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Figure 4.2: Migration Selection and Change of Rural Inequality 
Note: The figure is drawn using Stata when free parameter 1 0/ 1    and 0 0/ 10   . 
 
By assigning alternative values to parameters 1 0/   and 0 0/  , for instance, 
various 1 0/ [1, 2]   , 0 0/ 1,  5    and repeating the graphic analyses above, I 
conclude that the findings based on specific values of free parameters are likely to be 
robust to different choices of free parameters. 
Until now, I have established the theoretical relationships between the pattern of 
out-migration selection and the change of the rural inequality. As argued before, these 
relationships shed also light on empirical studies. Particularly, based on the 
knowledge of the pattern of migration selection, one can predict the direction of 
change of the redefined rural inequality. Before concluding this section, it seems 
necessary to make two further remarks about these relationships: Firstly, unlike the 
conventional view expressed in Lipton (1980) and Li (2003), these relationships are 
non-causal. They appear to be interrelated only because they relate to the same group 
of distributional parameters and hence to the same group of conditions of migration 
selection. These relationships should be thus labeled as spurious. Secondly, the 
exploration ignores the random term   that captures the first category of intra- 
household economic linkages. In this regard, the exploration is illuminating yet by no 
means definitive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACTS OF OUT-MIGRATION: THE MODEL WITH 
HETEROGENEOUS AND IMPERFECTLY SUBSTITUTIVE LABOR 
This chapter provides a preliminary discussion on the impacts that out-migration has 
on rural inequality in a more general setting, namely different types of labor inputs are 
imperfect substitutes in household agricultural production. 
The role of imperfect substitution among different types of labor inputs receives 
increasing attentions among economists in the past few decades, mainly because it is 
proven an essential component for understanding the rising skill premia and earning 
inequalities observed in many countries during that period.44 As for the context 
focused by this thesis, in the presence of imperfect substitution, the often selective 
out-migration tends to affect the wages earned by rural workers and thus rural 
inequality not only through changing the effective land-labor ratios of household 
farms, but also through changing the skill mix of workforces in household farms. The 
second channel – the skill mix effect is new for this chapter. 
5.1 The Constrained Maximization Problem 
Like in Chapter 4, I consider firstly the microeconomic problem faced by any rural 
household who attempts to maximize its income by reallocating the predetermined 
labor endowments provided by members between their own farms and emerging 
urban employments. 
Chapter 5 inherits most of the assumptions from Chapter 4, except that the 
substitution among different types of labor inputs is now imperfect, which suggests 
                                               
44 See Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey. 
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the parameter [0,1) . 
Therefore, the constrained income maximization problem faced by any rural 
household takes the form of 
1 10 (1 )/ 0
10 0{ ( )}
0
0 0
1
max ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ( )]
. . 0 ( ) ( )
{ ,{ ( ), }}
{ ( ), }
L s
            T A q s L s ds w s L s L s ds
s t         L s L s
where  A L s s  are predetermined,
and      w s s  are exogenously given.
     
 


 
 
Notice that as a byproduct, the nested CES specification used in this chapter 
requires the amounts of agricultural labor inputs at all skill levels must be strictly 
positive. This requirement causes no serious problem when we study economic agents 
of large scale such as the firms or aggregated economies, but given that the size of 
typical rural household farm is usually small, it seems often too restrictive. 
Nevertheless, bearing its drawback in mind, the preliminary discussion below will not 
question about its validity. 
Solving the constrained maximization problem faced by rural households gives 
the complimentary-slackness conditions as follows: 
 
0
0
log ( ,...) log ( ) ( ) ( );
log ( ,...) log ( ) ( ) ( ),
MPL s w s L s L s
MPL s w s L s L s
   

    
(5.1) 
where the log agricultural wage faced by a marginal worker at skill level s is given by 
 
1
log ( ,...) log ( ) log log ( ),MPL s T s a F s




  
 
(5.2) 
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which means that his log agricultural wage is determined by a skill-specific technical 
term 1/( ) (1 ) ( )T s q s T  , the effective land-labor ratio 
10 1/
0
/ ( ( ) ( ) )a A q s L s ds    
of his household farm and the labor share that his skill cell has in the household total 
agricultural workforce 
1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )F s q s L s q t L t dt   . Evaluating equation (5.2) at 
0 0(log ,{log ( )})a F s  and # #(log ,{log ( )})a F s  gives the pre- and post-migratory log 
agricultural wages such that 
 
0 0 01log ( ,...) log ( ) log log ( ),MPL s T s a F s




  
 
(5.3) 
 
# # #1log ( ,...) log ( ) log log ( ),MPL s T s a F s




  
 
(5.4) 
To utilize the insights from previous chapters, the complimentary-slackness 
conditions given by equation (5.1) is rearranged to a form resembling to equations 
(3.5) and (4.9). A critical step towards finding the alternative formulation of equation 
(5.1) is to construct the log reservation wages log ( ,...)rw s  of out-migration faced by 
marginal workers at different skill levels. After several mathematical manipulations, 
the formula of log reservation wages of out-migration is finally given by45 
 
0
#
1
#
0
1 ( ) ( )
log ( ,...) log ( ) log log .
( ) ( )
r q s L sw s T s a
q t L t dt






  

 (5.5) 
For types of labor inputs that are partially migratory, log ( ,...)rw s  in equation 
(5.5) measures the log opportunity costs of out-migration faced by them, that is, the 
log agricultural wages that these workers could earn if they choose “counterfactually” 
to stay on-farm, while workers of other types behave optimally according to equation 
                                               
45 See Appendix A for more details. 
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(5.1). For types of labor inputs that are completely non-migratory, their agricultural 
labor inputs keep unchanged, i.e. # 0( ) ( )L s L s , thus log ( ,...)rw s  in equation (5.5) 
measures the log agricultural wages that workers of these types actually earn. 
Reformulating the complimentary-slackness conditions in equation (5.1) in terms 
of log reservation wage log ( ,...)rw s  yields an equation with desirable property as 
follows 
 # 1log ( , ...) max{log ( ,...), log ( )},  [0,1]
rMPL s w s w s s   . (5.6) 
Moreover, the relation between the log reservation wage and log pre-migratory 
agricultural wage is given by 
 
0 # 0
0
log ( ,...) log ( ,...) ( 1)(log log )
log ( ,...) '.
rw s MPL s a a
MPL s
 

    
 
 (5.7)
 
Analogous to Chapter 4, equation (5.7) shows that log ( ,...)rw s  deviates from 
0log ( ,...)MPL s  by a term # 0' ( 1)(log log )a a      . The deviation '  
combines two often opposite-in-direction effects that out-migration has on log 
agricultural wages of staying workers and thus on log reservation wages. The first 
effect should have been familiar to the readers – Out-migration tends to increase the 
effective land-labor ratio of household farm and hence the log agricultural wages 
faced by all types of labor inputs. The second effect is that out-migration of some 
types of labor inputs tends to decrease the agricultural wages earned by types of labor 
inputs that are q- complimentary to the migratory types (Hamermesh, 1993). Suppose 
the first effect dominates, which is more likely when   is large, the overall effect is 
to increase the agricultural wages; otherwise, the overall effect is to decrease the 
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agricultural wages. Once again, like in Chapter 4, there exists no explicit solution to 
the additional term '  and we know little about the distributional properties of the 
corresponding random term '  at rural community level. 
Equations (5.6) and (5.7) can be adopted for describing the wage determination 
of all workers who are members of rural households, regardless of their occupations. 
With the help of the notation log ( ,...)w s  introduced in Chapter 4, the wage 
determination of all rural workers is given by 
 

1
0 '
log max{log ,log },  ,
 log log .
r
i i i
r
i i i
w w w i
where w MPL 
 
 
 (5.8) 
5.2 The Impacts on the Overall Inequality 
Having obtained equation (5.8) by solving the constrained maximization problem of 
individual rural household, it appears that like in Chapters 3 and 4, we could use the 
extended model as the analytical framework to explore the impacts that out-migration 
has on rural inequality. At the first sight, the subsequent exploration would not differ 
much from that in Chapter 4 except that the additional random term   is now 
replaced by ' . 
Unfortunately, as will be explained below, the imperfectness of substitution 
among different types of agricultural labor inputs leads to a serious violation of one of 
the basic assumptions maintained by the standard Roy model and virtually its various 
extensions in Chapters 3 and 4. Consequently, the Roy models in general cannot give 
any prediction on the impacts that out-migration has on the overall rural inequality, 
even in any approximate sense. 
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For the reason that the distributional properties of '  are largely unknown, we 
have to ignore it from this preliminary exploration altogether. As a result, the log 
reservation wage log ( ,...)rw s  equals to the log pre-migratory agricultural wage 
0log ( ,...)MPL s . Because of the imperfectness in labor substitution, observations of 
log pre-migratory agricultural wages 0log ( ,...)MPL s  in any rural community cannot 
be viewed as realizations of a univariate random variable, unless a rare occasion when 
the initial skill mix characterized by 0{log ( )}F s  happen to be the same among all 
households. For the majority cases of interest, the skill mix and thus 0log ( ,...)MPL s  
earned by rural workers should be represented by a continuous-time stochastic process, 
which can be loosely understood as a collection of possibly interrelated univariate 
random variables. This observation is responsible for the incapability of the Roy 
models continuing to serve as an analytical framework when the labor substitution is 
imperfect. 
To illustrate this key observation, let us revisit the expression of 0log ( ,...)MPL s  
given by equation (5.3) 
 
0 0 01log ( ,...) log ( ) log log ( ).MPL s T s a F s




    
By looking at the definition, it is found that at community level the first two 
right-hand side terms can be in principle represented by univariate random variables. 
To the contrary, for most cases of interest, the third right-hand side term cannot be 
represented by a univariate random variable. This is because at every skill level, the 
pre-migratory labor share 0 ( ) |F s s  is likely to vary across households, which 
suggests that conditional on the skill level, 0 ( )F s  and its function 0log ( )F s  can be 
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often represented by univariate random variables. If 0log ( ) |F s s  at all skill levels in 
the continuum [0,1]s  are stacked successively, they form a stochastic process. As 
suggested by equation (5.3), for the heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutive labor 
setting with [0,1) , if 0{log ( )}F s  is a stochastic process, hence 0{log }MPL  
must be a stochastic process as well. A graphical illustration why 0{log ( )}F s  forms 
a stochastic process is given in Figure 5.1 below. 
Since 0log ( ,...)MPL s  in any community cannot be represented by a univariate 
random variable, the distribution of 0 1(log ( ,...), log ( ))MPL s w s  at all skill levels 
cannot be jointly normal. Thus, one of the basic assumptions maintained by all of the 
Roy models, including the standard Roy model and its extensions in Chapters 3 and 4 
are violated. Therefore, in the presence of imperfectness in labor substitution, the Roy 
models provide no longer proper framework for the theoretical exploration of the 
overall distributional impacts of out-migration on inequality in source regions. 
 
Figure 5.1: An Illustration Why 0{log ( )}F s  Forms a Stochastic Process 
Note that bell-shape curves describe skill mixes of different households in the rural community. At all 
skill levels, the labor shares 0 ( )F s  are likely to vary across households. 
 
 
F0(s) 
s s=0 s=1 s’ s’’ 
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5.3 The Impacts on the Within- and Between-Group Inequalities 
Nevertheless, if we could be satisfied with answering narrower and less ambitious 
questions, for example, how out-migration affects the wage inequalities within skill- 
specific subgroups, Roy models may still provide insights on these issues. 
Conditional on rural workers’ skill levels, as already explained, 0log ( ) |F s s  
and 0log ( ,...) |MPL s s  can be represented by univariate random variables. Assuming 
further that the conditional distribution of 0(log ( ,...), log ( ))MPL s w s  is also jointly 
normal, the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 have shown clearly that 
  0[log ( ,...) | ] [log ( ,...) | ],Var w s s Var MPL s s s  , (5.9) 
which suggests that out-migration tends to decrease the wage inequalities within all 
skill-specific subgroups of rural workers. However, it is worthy to notice that this 
result remains valid in strict sense only when the existence of the random term '  
does not reverse the signs of inequalities given by equation (5.9). 
Until now, I have not explored the impacts that out-migration has on between- 
group wage inequalities, partly because that question is foremost an empirical one and 
hence the Roy models can offer limited help in answering it.46 
In literature on the Chinese labor markets, it is well established that the rate of 
return to schooling in urban regions exceeds that in rural regions. By assuming that 
schooling or say, formal education is the only or the dominating contributor to skill of 
rural workers, such empirical regularity may be stretched as the return to skill in urban 
regions exceeds its rural counterpart. It follows that between-group wage inequality 
                                               
46 The change of between-group wage inequalities resulting from immigration is the very question that 
Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2011) attempt to answer. 
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among skill-specific subgroups tends to increase, since rural workers’ post-migratory 
return to skill would resemble more closely to that in urban regions rather than that in 
rural regions. 
However, there are some doubts whether the skill of rural workers can be chiefly 
determined by formal education. In fact, empirical studies in Chapter 6 show that in 
period around the year 2000, the pattern of migration selection is likely to be the 
non-hierarchical sorting, which provides a rejection to the one-dimensional skill 
assumption.47 Besides education, other characteristics, especially working experience 
could be also important in determining the skill and wage earned by rural workers. 
Before leaving for the empirical exploration, I return briefly to the discussion on 
the microeconomic contents, or more precisely, on the source of pre-migratory wage 
inequality. Following the practices in Chapters 2 and 3, I calculate firstly the mean of 
log agricultural wages 0log ( ,...)MPL s  faced by all rural workers denoting by 
0
0 [log ( ,...)]E MPL s  . I subtract then 0  from 
0log ( ,...)MPL s  to obtain the 
demeaned error term 00 ( ,...)s . Finally, I attach the microeconomic contents to each of 
the decomposition components of 00 ( ,...)s . 
Applying the law of iterated expectation gives 
0
0
0 0
{ [log ( ,...) | ]}
1
{log ( ) [log ( ) | ] [log | ]}.
E E MPL s s
E T s E F s s E a s






  
 
 
                                               
47 The non-hierarchical sorting is impossible when skill is one-dimensional. See also footnote 11. 
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By definition of 0 0log ( ) [log ( ) | ]s E F s sF , the formula can be simplified as 
 
0 0
0
_ _ _
0
1
{log ( ) log ( )} {log }
1
log ( ) log ( ) log ,
E T s s E a
T s s a

 





  

  
F
F
 (5.10) 
where the new notation 0 ( )sF  turns out to be the geometric average of 0 ( )F s  
among all households in the rural community. s  and a  refer to s and a at which 
01log ( ) log ( )T s s



 F  and 0log a  equal to their community averages. 
Hence, the demeaned error term 00 ( ,...)s  is given by 
 
0 0
0 0
0 0 0
( ,...) log ( ,...)
1 1
log[ ( ) / ( )] log[ / ] log[ ( ) / ( )],
s MPL s
q s q s a a F s s
 
 

 
 
 
   F  (5.11) 
where the first right-hand side term corresponds to the individual-specific term i  in 
equation (2.8), the second term corresponds to the sector-specific term ji  in the 
same equation. Although the third term is also household-specific and difficult to be 
transferred across sectors, the demeaned term cannot be represented by a univariate 
random variable. Thus, it does not belong to ji  in equation (2.8). 
By expanding both log ( )q s  and 0log ( )sF  as first-order Taylor’s series 
around s s , equation (5.11) can be approximated as follows 
         
0 0 0 0
0
1
( ,...) [ ] log[ / ] log[ ( ) / ( )],totals r s s a a F s s

 


    F  (5.12) 
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where the total rate of return to skill in the agricultural sector totalr  is given by 
 
0 01 1log ( ) / log ( ) / log ( ) / .totalr d MPL s ds d q s ds d s ds

 

   F  (5.13)
 
The rate of return in equation (5.13) is labeled as the total rate because it consists 
of two parts. The first right-hand side term refers to the rate of return to skill when 
labor inputs in rural community of interest are balanced in quality so that the return 
relates only to the intrinsic agricultural productivity of labor input. The second term 
refers to the rate of return to skill owing to the relative scarcity of skill in rural 
community. 
Notice that for the special case where heterogeneous labor inputs are perfect 
substitutes in household agricultural production, i.e. 1  , the third right-hand side 
term in equation (5.12) disappears. Therefore, the demeaned error term 00 ( ,...)s  and 
hence 0log ( ,...)MPL s  faced by all rural workers can be represented by univariate 
random variables. The problem considered in this chapter reduces to a simpler one 
that has been explored in detail in Chapter 4. According to equation (5.13), for this 
special case when 1  , the rate of return to skill in agricultural sector depends only 
on intrinsic skills of rural workers such that 
 
0 1log ( ) / log ( ) / .partialr MPL s s d q s ds
     (5.14)
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS: PUZZLE AND EXPLANATIONS 
This chapter provides empirical explorations supplementing previous theoretical 
exploration of the impacts that out-migration has on rural inequality. In Chapters 3, 4 
and 5, I have analyzed the impacts using the extended Roy models based on various 
settings where labor inputs are homogenous (Chapter 3), heterogeneous and perfectly 
substitutive (Chapter 4), heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutive (Chapter 5) in 
household agricultural production. These analyses show that the predictions of the 
extended Roy models differ in three settings. The differences remind us the necessity 
of examining the relevance of these settings to the data before linking these theoretical 
predictions with the data. 
6.1 The Agricultural Technology, Labor Heterogeneity and Substitution 
To determine the setting of the highest relevance, I estimate in this section the 
agricultural production function of household farms in rural China. The results enable 
us to answer the following questions in sequence, namely (1) whether different types 
of labor inputs are perfectly substitutes in household agricultural production, and (2) 
provided that they are perfect substitutes, whether and to what extent they are 
heterogeneous in terms of intrinsic agricultural productivity. The discussion below 
centers on these two empirical questions. 
6.1.1 Data, Empirical Method and Specification 
In this subsection, I specify the data and empirical methods used in estimation, 
the definitions and measurements of inputs and output in household agricultural 
production as well as the functional forms of agricultural technology. 
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Data and Empirical Methods 
The following empirical exploration employs the Chinese Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) dataset, 1991-2009 as main data source.48 In each of the seven 
surveys, information on health, demographic and socioeconomic (such as employment 
and earning) factors are collected for individuals and their households residing in 
communities in up to nine provinces. All communities surveyed in the CHNS can be 
sorted into four regional categories: urban and suburban neighborhoods, county town 
and village. This section uses only the village subsample in estimation of the 
agricultural technology, which accounts for slightly more than half of all observations. 
Despite the CHNS data are essentially unbalanced panel data, I make no serious 
effort below to exploit its panel structure to facilitate precise identifications. This is 
because given sample size and data quality, and particularly the adoption of nonlinear 
specifications of technology the estimation using panel data involves often great 
difficulty in numerical optimization. Instead, in explorations below, the CHNS data is 
treated as if they were repeated cross-sectional and hence the production functions are 
estimated separately at each of the cross-sections.49 
The failure of exploiting the panel structure of the data makes it impossible to 
apply the fixed-effects strategy to mitigate the endogeneity problem of potential 
importance in estimation. Alternatively, I address this problem using the Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) with instruments. 
                                               
48 Nine panels of the CHNS were collected in years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
and 2011. In this thesis, only the data collected between 1991 and 2009 are used. The panel 1989 is not 
used mainly because the dummy of migration status cannot be constructed in that year. Panel 2011 is 
only available recently and thus cannot be used in this study. For more details on the data, reader may 
refer to Appendix D and CHNS documents. 
49 By treating panel data as repeated cross-sectional data, the precision of estimations reduces. 
Nevertheless, in comparison with estimations using the panel data, the present treatment allows for 
parameters of interest to change more freely over time. In a period of dramatic transitions, the 
advantage of the present treatment could be obvious. 
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Inputs and Output 
    In what follows, the output of household agricultural production is defined as the 
gross incomes from sale and self-consumption of the final products of household 
farming, gardening and livestock raising. The agricultural incomes are inflated to the 
currency values in 2009. 
The inputs of household agricultural production include land, material inputs and 
various types of labor services.50 The land input is defined as the amount of land 
cultivated by household in year before the survey. The material inputs consist of all 
intermediate inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and energy. Since the CHNS provides no 
detailed account on material inputs, they are approximated by the agricultural 
production cost inflated to the currency values in 2009. 
To answer the empirical questions focused by this section, all agricultural 
workers and their services are sorted into skill cells in terms of selected characteristics. 
In literature, educational attainment is one of the most used indicators for skill. Age or 
working experience is often regarded as another important indicator for skill. Other 
characteristics such as gender, marital status are sometimes considered. 
Because of the relatively small sample size (about 1500 household farms per 
year), and large amounts of measurement errors in the data, it seems impossible to 
divide the workforce into fine skill cells and meanwhile, to obtain precise estimates. I 
consider thus only two dimensions of skill, i.e. education and age.51 The agricultural 
                                               
50 I do not include the capital input, since it contains a large amount of measurement errors and could 
lead to serious attenuation biases in estimations. For more details, reader may see Appendix D. 
51 Gender could be another dimension of workers’ skill. However, given the data, defining skill cells 
using all of three dimensions of skill would make estimations very difficult. Thus, in empirical studies 
below, only education and age are of primary concern. This decision could be further justified by the 
fact that even if functional forms allowing for differences in productivity between male and female 
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workers are classified into two groups with similar education, namely those who have 
no Junior High School (“JHS-”) diploma and those who have JHS or a higher diploma 
(“JHS” or “JHS+”). Besides, agricultural workers are also classified into two age 
groups, namely young workers (“YG” aged below 35), and middle or old aged 
workers (“MA” aged between 35 and 55; “OA” aged above 55). Hence, there are four 
broadly defined education-age cells in the workforce.52 Labor services provided by 
workers in different cells are viewed as different types of labor inputs. 
 Moreover, in literature labor inputs can be measured either in head counts or in 
working hours. Labor economists prefer generally the latter. However, previous 
experiments suggest that the data of working hours constructed from the CHNS data 
could be contaminated by measurement errors. Thus, measuring the labor inputs using 
the hours could lead to severe attenuation bias. For instance, it is not uncommon to 
find observations of workers who reported more than 11 working hours per day in the 
year before the survey. Even after excluding these obvious outliers, regressions using 
                                                                                                                                      
workers with similar education and age are adopted, results suggest that gender productivity gaps may 
not be as large as what originally expected. 
52 In the U.S. literature, skilled and unskilled workers are usually defined in terms of education. Skilled 
workers are defined as college graduates or their equivalences, while unskilled workers are defined as 
high school graduates or their equivalences. In rural China, however, I doubt the usefulness of these 
definitions. This is because the average education in rural China is remarkably lower than that in the 
U.S. (see Section 6.2). Suppose that the U.S. definition were adopted, the vast majority of agricultural 
workers in rural China would have to be classified as less skilled workers. Recognizing this difficulty, I 
proposed to sort all rural workers into three educational groups, i.e. “JHS-”, “JHS” and “JHS+”, which 
correspond roughly to the less, medium and highly educated workers. Workers with exact “JHS” 
diploma are defined separately from others, partly because the law of compulsory education in China 
requires children keeping enrolled in the school until the completion of JHS education. Consequently, a 
considerable share (often around 50%) of rural workers has completed their JHS education before they 
enter the labor markets. Moreover, the urban employers often use the JHS diploma as filter in 
recruitment of rural workers. Besides, workers are often sorted into age or experience groups. For 
example, Borjas (2003) defines several five- year experience intervals and sort workers into these 
experience groups. In this thesis, due to the small sample size of data and estimation methods, I 
proposed to define age groups more broadly in 20 years age intervals, namely 35-, 35-55 and 55+. 
According to the scheme, there are up to nine education-age cells. 
Unfortunately, for surveys in the 1990s, regressions of agricultural production function using the 
nine-skill-cell scheme fail to give precise estimates on parameters. This suggests that I am asking 
questions that may be too subtle for the available data to answer with any precision. Therefore, I turn to 
the present specification in the main text by combing finer skill cells into broader ones to obtain precise 
estimates of key parameters. For the surveys 2000 onwards, however, regressions based on the 
nine-skill-cell scheme are able to give relatively precise estimates of all parameters of interest. 
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the annual agricultural working hours as an explanatory variable give often estimates 
of the returns to scale at the magnitude around 0.7 or even lower, which suggests the 
technology adopted by Chinese household farms exhibits strong decreasing return to 
scale. This finding is inconsistent with the empirical evidences presented in Xu et al. 
(2001). Therefore, throughout the empirical explorations below, I decide to measure 
the agricultural labor inputs in head counts. 
Technology 
Keeping the two empirical questions in mind, the functional forms that impose 
overly strong restrictions on the substitution and productivity heterogeneity among 
different types of labor inputs should be avoided. For the reason that the sizes of 
households are usually small and skills of household members are often correlated, 
the widely used Translog functional form may not be appropriate for estimating the 
agricultural technology of household farms. 53  Instead, like previous chapters, 
empirical explorations below use the nested CES as main specification. A noteworthy 
advantage of the nested CES is that it is compatible to zero inputs, while it preserves 
much of the virtue of the Translog for it places weak ex ante restrictions on the 
substitution and heterogeneity among labor inputs. 
    Following a large literature (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2008 and 2012), this section assumes that the aggregate labor and non-labor 
inputs are separable in household agricultural production and the technology that 
                                               
53 Jacoby (1993) adopts nevertheless the Translog and its special case - the Cobb-Douglas forms in 
estimating the agricultural production functions in Peru. His strategy is to add one to all inputs to avoid 
a large number of zero inputs that are incompatible to both functional forms. However, his strategy is 
not convincing for the reason that although adding one to all inputs could have only marginal effects on 
the magnitude and direction of input vector, it would be not the case for those of input vector after 
logarithm-transformation, especially when many inputs are exactly zero. 
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combines them takes the form of Cobb-Douglas.54 
The aggregate labor input can be further viewed as the outcome of different types 
of labor inputs combined by certain CES or nested CES technology. Ideally, one 
should rely on the knowledge on the ease of substitution to guide the labor 
aggregation. However, reliable estimates on this issue are often unavailable. As a 
result, I stick to two widely accepted ways of labor aggregation as follows: 
a. Two-Level Nested CES 
At the higher level of the two-level nested CES specification, a Cobb-Douglas 
technology combines the aggregate labor input (QL) and non-labor inputs such as land 
(A) and material (M). At its lower level, the aggregate labor input is expressed as 
outcome of a CES function with four education-age-specific labor entries.55, 56 
 
4 41/
1 1
log log log log
( ) , 1
A M QL
s s s
          y A M QL u
where QL L  with  
   
 
    
    
(6.1) 
b. Three-Level Nested CES 
At the highest level of the three-level nested CES specification, a Cobb-Douglas 
technology combines the aggregate labor inputs and non-labor inputs. The aggregate 
                                               
54 Another literature that focuses on the skill-capital complementarity (see for example, Grilliches, 
1969) does not assume this kind of separablity. As pointed out in Borjas (2014), the Cobb-Douglas 
specification is not entirely innocuous when we analyze the impacts of immigration. Nevertheless, in 
the literature mentioned in the text, virtually all studies adopt it as the functional form for the highest 
level of the nested CES. 
55 Strictly speaking, in theoretical chapters I consider mostly the value-added functions instead of the 
production functions. 
56 This specification is often criticized for it assumes the same elasticity of substitution between any 
pair of labor inputs, which is often unrealistic for cases with more than two labor inputs. Nevertheless, 
this specification offers a simple and empirically convenient way to capture both the productivity 
heterogeneity and the imperfect substitution among different labor inputs. Note that parameters 
1 4
~   
have been normalized so that 1s s  . The normalization has no effect on outcomes as long as the 
constant term   is included. 
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labor input is firstly divided into two educational groups at intermediate level. Each of 
the educational groups is then divided into two age subgroups at its lowest level. This 
functional form appears repeatedly in the labor economic literature.57, 58 
 
1/
1/
log log log log
( ) , 1
( ) , 1
;
A M QL
i i i i i
i j ij ij j ij
          y A M QL u
where QL L  with 
and     L L  with 
           i: educational  groups  j: age subgroups.
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 
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 (6.2) 
Furthermore, for each of the specifications above, I consider two of its variants in 
which (i) all parameters in the production functions keep the same for all provinces, 
and (ii) the hicksian technical factor   is allowed to vary across provinces.
59 
6.1.2 NLS Estimations 
After specifying the data, inputs and outputs, and agricultural technology, I 
present key results of the Nonlinear Least Square (NLS) regressions. Luckily, these 
regressions provide relatively clear-cut evidences to give preliminary though still 
preliminary answers to two empirical questions focused by this section and thus to 
help us to discriminate three theoretical settings discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
 
                                               
57 See particularly, Card and Lemieux (2001), Borjas (2003). 
58 Alternatively, the aggregate labor input can be firstly decomposed as two age groups. Each of these 
age groups can be then decomposed as two educational subgroups. Although this alternative three-level 
nested CES can be rarely seen in the literature, I see no a priori reason why this specification must be 
inferior to the one used in the main text. Given the data at hand, results of estimations based on this 
alternative specification resemble to those based on the two-level nested CES specification. Thus, in 
the text I do not report the results based on it. 
59 As experiments, I estimated using a more flexible variant of the specification in which αA, αM, αQL 
can vary across provinces. Answers to the two central empirical questions are largely unaffected. Given 
the data and specification, it turns out difficult to allow further parameters in the production functions 
to vary across provinces. 
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For the first empirical question, namely whether different types of labor inputs 
are perfect substitutes in household agricultural production, estimations suggest that it 
is likely to be the case. In all regressions presented in Table 6.1, the original 
hypotheses that the elasticity-of-substitution-related parameters, i.e., {ρ, η, θ} take the 
value of 1 cannot be rejected at 5% significance level, which means that the 
hypotheses that different labor inputs are perfect substitutes cannot be rejected.60 
Year 
Two-Level Three-Level 
i ii i ii 
1991 ρ=0.90*# ρ=0.81*# 
η=0.82*#; 
θ=1.21*# 
N.A. 
1993 ρ=1.49# ρ=1.62# η=1.46
#; 
θ=1.52# 
N.A. 
1997 ρ=0.73*# ρ=0.74# 
η=0.66*#; 
θ=1.00# N.A. 
2000 ρ=0.98*# ρ=1.00*# η=0.94
*#; 
θ=1.12*# 
N.A. 
2004 ρ=1.28*# ρ=1.31# 
η=13.98#; 
θ=0.68# N.A. 
2006 ρ=0.84*# ρ=0.90*# η=0.98
*#; 
θ=0.62# 
N.A. 
2009 ρ=0.95*# ρ=0.96*# η=0.91
*#; 
θ=1.51# 
N.A. 
 
Table 6.1: NLS Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution 
 
Note that this table reports only estimates of the elasticity-of-substitution-related parameters. Estimates 
of other parameters are not reported for the reason of space. [1] Variant i: The same parameters for all 
provinces; Variant ii: Allowing for τ varying across provinces. [2] Dependent variable: Log agricultural 
gross income in 2009 RMB. [3] Independent variables: Skill-specific Labor in head counts; Land in Mu 
(1 Mu=6.67 Ares); Material approximated by the production costs in 2009 RMB. [4] Standard errors 
are robust and clustered at community level. * indicates significance at 5% level. [5] #: H0: ρ=1 
(η=1/θ=1) cannot be rejected at 5% significance level. [6] N.A.: Result is not available owing to 
difficulties in the numerical optimizations. 
 
Next, I turn to the second empirical question. Given the fact that the hypothesis 
that different types of labor inputs are perfect substitutes in household agricultural 
production cannot be rejected, I wonder to know whether and to what extent they are 
heterogeneous in agricultural productivity. To improve the precision of estimation, a 
                                               
60 Inspection of Table 6.1 shows also that the estimates of {ρ, η, θ} may not be very precise. Thus, I 
could make sometimes the type II errors. Nevertheless, I find that all estimates of these parameters tend 
to cluster around unity. 
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simpler functional form of the agricultural technology is adopted hereafter: 
c. Heterogeneous and Perfectly Substitutive 
 4 4
1 1
log log log log
, 1
A M QL
s s s
          y A M QL u
where QL L  with 
   
 
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  
 (6.3)
 
Note that the functional form above relates closely to that used in Chapter 4. 
Suppose different types of labor inputs are homogeneous in intrinsic agricultural 
productivity, i.e. 1 2 3 4 1/ 4       , it reduces to a functional form similar to 
that used in Chapter 3. 
Running the NLS regressions with functional form given by equation (6.3) 
produce a new set of estimates on 1 4~  , among others. A summary of the key 
results obtained from these regressions is given in Table 6.2 below. 
By inspection of Table 6.2, it is found that the coefficients of 1 4~   are usually 
different from each other, but the differences tend to be small. To answer the question 
of interest formally, the Wald tests are used. The outputs of the Wald tests show that 
the original hypothesis H0: 1 2 3 4       must be rejected at the 5% significance 
level in the CHNS 2000 and 2009, and it must be rejected at 10% significance level in 
the CHNS 2006. By contrast, for the rest surveys, especially for those in the early 
1990s, the original hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. 
Therefore, for the whole period considered, equation (6.3) provides a unified 
specification for estimating of agricultural technology adopted by household farms. 
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Parameter Year 
Heterogeneous and 
Perfect Substitutive  
i ii 
β1 
1991 0.27* 0.24* 
1993 0.14 0.11 
1997 0.20* 0.26* 
2000 0.23* 0.24* 
2004 0.51* 0.46* 
2006 0.27* 0.30* 
2009 0.29* 0.28* 
β2 
1991 0.26* 0.28* 
1993 0.17 0.16 
1997 0.23* 0.22* 
2000 0.23* 0.22* 
2004 0.12 0.13 
2006 0.21* 0.19* 
2009 0.28* 0.26* 
β3 
1991 0.20* 0.19* 
1993 0.18* 0.20* 
1997 0.21* 0.22* 
2000 0.16* 0.18* 
2004 0.15 0.19 
2006 0.29* 0.30* 
2009 0.12* 0.12* 
β4 
1991 0.27* 0.30* 
1993 0.52* 0.53* 
1997 0.35* 0.30* 
2000 0.38* 0.36* 
2004 0.22 0.22* 
2006 0.23* 0.21* 
2009 0.31* 0.33* 
 
Table 6.2: Estimates on the Labor Heterogeneity 
 
Note that β4 is calculated using β4=1-β1-β2-β3. Standard errors of β4 are obtained by using Stata’s lincom 
command. * indicates significance at 5% level. Like Table 6.1, for the variant i, all parameters are the 
same across provinces, while for the variant ii, parameter τ varies across provinces. 
  
In sum, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate that (1) different labor inputs are likely to 
be perfect substitutes in household agricultural production and (2) the productivity 
heterogeneity among agricultural labor inputs becomes increasingly important over 
time. Therefore, based on the NLS estimations, I draw a preliminary conclusion that 
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the theoretical setting analyzed in Chapter 4 in which agricultural labor inputs are 
heterogeneous and perfectly substitutive could be of the highest relevance to the 
CHNS data. 
6.1.3 Endogeneity and GMM 
In all of the regressions above, I pay no attention to the fact that the agricultural 
inputs, especially the labor and material inputs could be endogenous in the sense that 
(1) they could correlate with the unobserved productivity of household farms, and (2) 
they could correlate with shocks anticipated by households.61 It is well known that in 
the presence of endogenous variables, the NLS estimator is inconsistent. In other 
words, the endogeneity problem challenges the validity of previous NLS regressions 
and thus the validity of the conclusion drawn from them. As a response, this 
subsection sets out to re-estimate the production functions using the GMM in the hope 
of mitigating the endogeneity problem. 
A prerequisite of applying the GMM is to find enough valid instrumental 
variables. For the GMM estimations below, I propose to use the log household labor 
forces at all four skill levels, their community averages, the one-period lag of log 
material input, together with the log land input as instrumental variables.62 
Given the data and nonlinear specifications of the form equations (6.1) and (6.2), 
GMM estimations cannot be used to answer the first empirical question. Hence, this 
                                               
61 The former is often called as the omitted variable bias, while the latter is related to the simultaneity 
bias in the econometric literature. 
62 The numbers of household labor forces at four skill levels are likely to be valid instruments because 
(1) they are largely determined by households’ past decisions on fertility and human capital investment, 
and (2) in the presence of imperfect rural labor market, households’ agricultural labor inputs depend on 
their labor endowments. For similar reasons, community average of households’ labor forces at four 
skill levels could serve as valid instruments as well. The validity of lagged log material input is 
questionable: It may not correlate with current anticipated shocks, but if the unobserved farm 
productivity is time-invariant or highly persistent, then the lagged log material input could correlate 
with unobserved productivity in the error term. 
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subsection addresses only the second empirical question using the GMM. In all 
regressions below, household agricultural production functions take the form of 
equation (6.3). Moreover, to reduce the difficulties in numerical optimization, the 
production function is assumed to be the same across provinces in each year. Table 6.3 
compares the NLS and GMM estimates of 1 4~  .
63 
Year Parameter NLS GMM 
1991 
β1 0.26
* 0.23* 
β2 0.26
* 0.26* 
β3 0.20
* 0.20* 
β4 0.27
* 0.31 
1993 
β1 0.13 0.07 
β2 0.17 0.25
* 
β3 0.19
* 0.29* 
β4 0.52
* 0.39 
1997 
β1 0.20
* 0.19* 
β2 0.23
* 0.27* 
β3 0.21
* 0.21* 
β4 0.35
* 0.32* 
2000 
β1 0.23
* 0.26* 
β2 0.23
* 0.28* 
β3 0.17
* 0.14* 
β4 0.38
* 0.32* 
2004 
β1 0.51
* 0.25* 
β2 0.12 0.21
* 
β3 0.15 0.22 
β4 0.22 0.32
* 
2006 
β1 0.27
* 0.19* 
β2 0.21
* 0.20* 
β3 0.29
* 0.39* 
β4 0.23
* 0.23* 
2009 
β1 0.29
* 0.14 
β2 0.29
* 0.20 
β3 0.12
* 0.26 
β4 0.31
* 0.40 
Table 6.3: Comparison of the NLS and GMM Estimates 
                                               
63 The sample used in the NLS and GMM estimations in Table 6.3 differs from that used in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2 in a minor aspect, namely in regressions reported in Table 6.3, I exclude the observations of 
agricultural workers whose annual working hours exceed 4000 hours. This difference could explain the 
small and often ignorable differences between results of the NLS estimations in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. 
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Note that for the NLS estimations above, the standard errors are robust and clustered at community 
level. For the GMM estimations above, the weight matrix is adjusted for correlation within the 
community. * indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
According to the outputs of Hansen’s J test of overidentifying, it is found that in 
all surveys except the CHNS 2000, the original hypothesis of the test stating that all 
instrumental variables are valid cannot be rejected at 5% significance level, which 
suggests in absence from other complications, the GMM regressions offer consistent 
estimates. The Wald test is employed to determine whether different types of labor 
inputs are heterogeneous. The results suggest that in later surveys, especially in the 
CHNS 2000 and 2006, there are weak evidences to support the existence of labor 
heterogeneity in agriculture. Therefore, GMM estimations confirm largely the 
preliminary conclusion based on NLS estimations. 
6.2 The Pattern of Migration Selection 
Section 6.1 suggests the setting in Chapter 4 has the highest empirical relevance. One 
of the implications of the extended Roy model based on that setting are that there exist 
some approximate relationships between the pattern of migration selection and change 
of rural inequality. Such relationships can be used to predict the direction of change of 
rural inequality if the pattern of migration selection can be known in advance. 
Therefore, the present section attempts to identify the pattern of migration selection 
from the CHNS data. As byproducts, I obtain predicted log shadow wages faced by 
rural workers when they were employed on farms and in urban non-agricultural sector. 
These predicted shadow wages will be useful in next section. 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To get some intuitive feeling on the pattern of migration selection, I present 
firstly descriptive statistics about characteristics of the migratory and staying rural 
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workers.64 Preliminary results on the pattern of migration selection can be obtained 
by comparing these characteristics of both subgroups. 
Numerous studies have shown that migratory workers do not make up a random 
sample of the working age population from source regions. As demonstrated in Table 
6.4 below, migratory and staying rural workers differ in several observable individual- 
specific characteristics as well as in their household backgrounds.65 
Year Characteristic Migratory Staying 
1991 
schooling 7.47 5.21 
age 27.19 37.42 
female 0.52 0.52 
schooling (household head) 4.97 5.55 
age (household head) 48.03 44.18 
female (household head) 0.16 0.10 
lagged (A/L) 2.21 2.09 
1993 
schooling 7.20 5.40 
age 26.42 38.50 
female 0.50 0.51 
schooling (household head) 5.14 5.67 
age (household head) 49.28 45.78 
female (household head) 0.15 0.10 
lagged (A/L) 1.88 2.03 
1997 
schooling 7.62 5.68 
age 25.73 39.47 
female 0.55 0.50 
schooling (household head) 5.06 5.86 
age (household head) 51.30 47.31 
female (household head) 0.15 0.11 
lagged (A/L) 1.90 2.23 
2000 
schooling 8.49 6.18 
age 26.38 40.83 
female 0.52 0.50 
schooling (household head) 6.09 6.39 
age (household head) 50.01 48.41 
female (household head) 0.10 0.09 
lagged (A/L) 2.58 3.19 
 
 
                                               
64 The concrete definitions of the migratory and staying rural workers can be found in Appendix D. 
65 The sample used to generate the descriptive statistics is restricted to village residents (1) who are 
aged between 15 and 75 and do not enroll at school at the time of survey and (2) who are members of 
households who are engaged in agricultural production. 
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(Continuation) 
Year Characteristic Migratory Staying 
2004 
schooling 8.61 6.50 
age 27.38 43.72 
female 0.49 0.50 
schooling (household head) 6.75 6.89 
age (household head) 51.52 50.69 
female (household head) 0.10 0.08 
lagged (A/L) 2.40 3.14 
2006 
schooling 8.45 6.51 
age 29.92 43.79 
female 0.57 0.51 
schooling (household head) 6.01 6.54 
age (household head) 55.48 52.83 
female (household head) 0.12 0.10 
lagged (A/L) 2.52 3.72 
2009 
schooling 8.56 6.66 
age 31.99 46.01 
female 0.59 0.50 
schooling (household head) 6.22 6.89 
age (household head) 57.42 54.21 
female (household head) 0.12 0.08 
lagged (A/L) 3.40 4.13 
 
Table 6.4: Migration Selection on Observable Characteristics 
 
Note that “schooling” denotes the years of completed formal education. “Female” is a dummy variable. 
“Lagged (A/L)” denotes the one-period-lagged land-labor ratio of household farms. 
 
According to Table 6.4, migratory rural workers are on average more than 10 
years younger than staying rural workers are. The average education of migratory 
rural workers is also higher than that of staying rural workers.66 The difference 
between years of education of both subgroups is about two years.67 These findings 
are roughly consistent with existing empirical studies. Besides, the sex ratios in both 
                                               
66 Among all young migratory rural workers, those who have exact junior high school diploma take 
always the highest share. On average, the share for the skill cell “JHS×YG” is about 40 - 50% among 
migratory rural workers. By contrast, the share for the same skill cell is only about 20% among staying 
rural workers. 
67 Considering that the standard deviations of years of schooling for migratory and staying rural 
workers are about 3 and 4, a two-year-difference could be large. However, we cannot conclude that out- 
migration is strongly positively sorting in terms of education. In fact, migratory rural workers are also 
much younger than staying rural workers are. Since the educational attainment rises rapidly across age 
cohorts in past few decades in China, I suspect that a substantial fraction of the educational differential 
should be attributed to the cohort effect. To control for the cohort effect, years of schooling should be 
compared within the age cohorts. In particular, given that most out-migrations occur before 35 years 
old, I pay special attention on that cohort. It turns out that after controlling for the cohort effect, 
migratory rural workers have still higher education than staying rural workers do. Yet, the educational 
differential between two subgroups within that cohort becomes smaller: On average, the educational 
differential within that cohort is about 1/3 as large as the overall differential. 
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subgroups are close to balanced. 
As for the household backgrounds of both worker subgroups, migratory rural 
workers tend to come from relatively disadvantageous households: For instance, in all 
surveys, heads of migratory rural workers’ household are slightly older, less educated 
than heads of staying rural workers’ households.68 The percentage of female-headed 
households is usually higher for migratory rural workers than staying rural workers. 
Furthermore, in most surveys, household farms from which migratory rural workers 
come have smaller ex ante land-labor ratios.69 The shortage of cultivated land of 
household farms could push rural workers to search for off-farm employments. 
6.2.2 Migration Selection in terms of Log Agricultural Wages 
To determine the pattern of migration selection with higher precision, I return to 
its definition given in Chapter 2.70,71 By definition, the pattern is jointly determined 
by the relative sizes of average log wages earned by migratory and staying rural 
workers when they were employed in household farms and in urban sector. The 
present subsection focuses on comparison of average log agricultural wages, while the 
next subsection focuses on comparison of average log urban wages. 
 
                                               
68 On average, the former are about 3 years older than the latter are. The years of schooling for the 
former are about 0.5 year shorter than the latter are. 
69 The land-labor ratios reported in Table 6.4 have not adjusted for labor heterogeneity. Moreover, all 
land-labor ratios in the table are the one-period lags for the reason that a resident’s current migratory 
status is usually influenced by the ex ante ratio of his household farm. Unlike other characteristics in 
the table, out-migration is likely to have direct impacts on the ratio of household farm. Therefore, the 
one-period lags of the ratios are used here as proxies for the ex ante ratios. 
70 It is not uncommon that the patterns predicted by different characteristics disagree. To solve the 
problem, we could map all of these characteristics onto the real line and then evaluate the pattern based 
on the real index. A natural choice for such an index is the (log) wage itself. This observation provides 
a rationale for returning to the form definitions. 
71 See also Appendix D. 
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To begin with, let us consider the average log agricultural wage of staying rural 
workers, i.e. 0log ( 0)w I  , which is the sample counterpart of 0(log | 0)E w I  . 
As assumed in Chapter 4, all rural households of interest employ the same 
agricultural technology in the form of 
 ,QLNLy NL QL  (6.4) 
where NL and QL denote the aggregate non-labor and labor inputs in agriculture. 
Since different types of labor inputs are by assumption heterogeneous and perfectly 
substitutive, the aggregate household labor input in agriculture is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ; ).s s iQL s L s s L s i      (6.5) 
Applying the chain rule and taking logarithm yield the log agricultural wage that 
any staying rural worker whose skill level is s could earn as follows 
0log log ( ) log / .w s y QL     
    Therefore, we obtain 
0(log | 0) (log ( ) | 0) (log / | 0),E w I E s I E y QL I        
and its sample counterpart 
 0log ( 0) ( ; 0) log ( ) log / ( 0),s iw I s I s y QL I          (6.6)
 
where ( ; 0)s I   denotes the share of s-type workers in all staying rural workers.72 
Thus, the first right-hand side term in equation (6.6) refers to the weighted average of 
                                               
72 See Appendix D, Table D.1. 
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log individual-specific agricultural productivity among staying rural workers. The 
second right-hand side term refers to the average of log agricultural productivity 
relating to their household farms’ production conditions. 
    With modifications, equation (6.6) can be adapted for evaluating the average log 
agricultural wage earned by rural migratory workers, i.e. 0log ( 1)w I  . However, I 
need to address two difficult issues beforehand, both of which relate to the issues of 
counterfactual inference. The first difficulty lies in the fact that for migratory rural 
workers, especially for those who have withdrawn completely from agriculture, their 
agricultural wages cannot be observed. The second difficulty lies in the fact that to 
infer the agricultural wages earned by migratory rural workers, we need to think of a 
hypothetical scenario in which migratory rural workers would stay on-farm. The 
counterfactual stay of migratory workers could affect the agricultural wages earned by 
staying rural workers or even migration decisions of household members at the 
margin of migration and stay. 
    As a partial solution to the first issue, the exploration below employs a largely 
untested assumption to help the identification, namely within each broadly defined 
education-age cells, migratory and staying rural workers have the same individual- 
specific agricultural productivity. Under this assumption, the estimates of { ( )}s  
obtained in Section 6.1 can be used to evaluate the log agricultural wages of both 
subgroups. To avoid the complication caused by the second issue, one needs to 
calculate the log agricultural wages of both subgroups on a comparable basis. Since in 
the CHNS, a large fraction of migrants have only recently moved to urban regions, I 
use the one-period-lags of households’ agricultural inputs 1 1 1 1{ , , }t t t tX A M QL    , 
and current technical parameters , , ,{ , , , ,{ ( )}}t t A t M t QL t t s       to evaluate the log 
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agricultural wages of both subgroups. 
    By comparing the average log agricultural wages of migratory and staying rural 
workers evaluated on the common basis of 1tX   and t , I obtain the pattern of 
migration selection in terms of average log agricultural wages. 
Year 
NLS GMM 
Migratory Staying Δ Migratory Staying Δ 
1991 6.29  6.35  -0.06  6.27  6.35  -0.08  
1993 5.45  5.51  -0.06  5.87  6.03  -0.16  
1997 6.41  6.53  -0.12  6.24  6.44  -0.20  
2000 6.84  7.03  -0.19  6.90  7.21  -0.31  
2004 6.04  5.90  0.14  6.84  6.92  -0.08  
2006 7.08  6.99  0.09  8.39  8.19  0.20  
2009 7.41  7.71  -0.30  7.63  7.59  0.04  
 
Table 6.5: Migration Selection in terms of the Log Agricultural Wages 
 
Note that the difference of average log agricultural wages faced by migratory and staying rural workers 
is defined by ( ; 1) log ( ) ( ; 0) log ( )
s s
s I s s I s          . Δ denotes the growth rate. In the left 
panel of Table 6.5, the log agricultural wages are evaluated using the technical factors Θt obtained from 
the NLS regressions in Section 6.1, whereas in the right panel of the table, the log agricultural wages 
are evaluated using the technical factors Θt obtained from the GMM regressions in Section 6.1. 
 
Inspecting of Table 6.5 shows that the difference of average log agricultural 
wages faced by both rural worker groups denoting by   changes its sign from 
negative to positive around the early or middle 2000s, which means on average 
migratory workers may have caught up with and even overtaken staying workers in 
terms of the agricultural wages. Further analysis suggests that the overtaking is driven 
primarily by the increase in individual-specific agricultural productivity of migratory 
workers comparing with their staying counterparts. 
6.2.3 Migration Selection in terms of Log Urban Wages 
According to the definition of pattern of migration selection, I proceed to 
determine the pattern in terms of log urban non-agricultural wages. 
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This task is challenging for two reasons: The log urban wages faced by staying 
rural workers are unobservable; More importantly, partly owing to difficulties in data 
collection, the CHNS offer limited information on employment and wages of 
migratory rural workers.73 The limited data availability rules out the possibility of 
using existing structural approaches to determine the pattern more rigorously.74 
As a preliminary attempt, I propose to predict the log urban wages faced by both 
migratory and staying rural workers using the earning functions of urban blue-collar 
workers.75 This proposition is not self-evident, some justifications are thus offered for 
it below. 
Migration has usually profound impacts on the destination: It causes often 
adjustments in multiple good and factor markets. Under certain circumstances, it 
affects the wage determination at the source and destination. Various effects of 
migration on the wage determination are called as the general equilibrium effects.76 
Unfortunately, in the literature that uses the Roy model as analytical framework, the 
general equilibrium effects are difficult to be incorporated and are thus usually 
ignored for simplicity. I follow the literature hereafter by treating the wage 
                                               
73 Up to the CHNS 2000, only about 30% of working age migrants report positive wages. From the 
CHNS 2004 onwards, owing to changes of the questionnaire design, virtually no working age migrant 
reports positive wage. Instead, only the remittances are reported. The empirical study below shows that 
the reported and predicted log hourly wages earned by rural migrants are usually similar. The former is 
only about 10% lower than the latter. The correlation coefficients between rural migrants’ reported and 
predicted log hourly wages are also reasonably high. They are often at the level around 0.6. 
74 See for example the empirical methods surveyed by French and Taber (2011). 
75 Blue-collar workers include skilled and unskilled labor, service workers, drivers and athlete, since 
the earning functions of workers with these occupations differ often significantly from those with 
professional occupations, while their earning functions resemble to that of unskilled labor. 
76 The general equilibrium effects are ignorable if (1) the size of the newly arrived rural migratory 
workers is small relative to that of the urban native workers, or (2) urban industries can expand or 
contract freely to absorb the labor supply shocks, and the good markets adjust accordingly. Notably, if 
the condition (2) is the case, then the general equilibrium effects disappear entirely. This is known as 
the Rybczynski theorem. For an engaging discussion on the theorem and its application in the 
immigration context, reader may refer to Leamer (2009). 
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determination in urban sector as fixed. 
In practice, the term “wage determination” is often understood as an equivalent 
to the earning function that captures the relationship between wage and various skill 
components. Thus, I treat the earning function of urban workers also as fixed. 
The reasoning above does not guarantee that we can use the earning functions of 
all urban workers to predict the log urban wages faced by both migratory and staying 
rural workers. This is largely because in many developing countries like China, the 
phenomenon “occupational segmentation” exists to varying extent in the urban labor 
market. Migratory rural workers and native urban workers tend to take different 
occupations. 77 , 78  As for the Chinese context, a plenty of evidences show that 
migratory rural workers have a much higher possibility of being employed as blue- 
collar workers than urban workers do.79 Furthermore, as suggested by the descriptive 
statistics in Table 6.4, staying rural workers are on average less educated and older 
than migratory rural workers are, thus comparing to their migratory counterparts, 
staying rural workers would be even more likely to be employed as blue-collar 
workers if they could work in the urban sector. The empirical exploration below will 
make use of this key observation that rural workers as a whole tend to take blue-collar 
urban occupations to give reasonable predictions about the log urban wages faced by 
all rural workers. 
                                               
77  In the tradition of development economics, explicit theoretical modeling of the occupational 
segmentation can be traced back at least to Todaro (1969). 
78 Of course, to conduct study along this line, there must be some overlaps between occupations of 
both subgroups. 
79 Based on a survey in 1995, Du (1997) reports that the majority of rural migrants are employed in a 
small number of urban industries such as construction and service. Meng and Zhang (2001) find that in 
the middle 1990s, only 4% of rural migrants in Shanghai are white-collar workers with professional, 
technical or managerial occupations, while 35% of urban residents are white-collar workers. Based on 
the China 1% National Population Sample Survey, 2005, Xing (2008) shows that most rural migrants 
work in urban manufacturing and service industries, but the industrial and occupational distributions of 
urban residents are far more disperse. 
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To justify the proposition, I need to argue further that within blue-collar 
occupations, the urban wages are primarily determined by their observable skill 
components instead of their residency so that the earning functions of blue-collar 
urban workers can be applied to predict the log urban wages faced by all rural workers. 
Related empirical evidences are somewhat mixed: Meng and Zhang (2001) find more 
than 100 percent of total wage differentials between rural migrants and urban 
residents are the “unexplained intra-occupational differentials” or the discrimination 
within occupations.80 To the contrary, Xing (2008) finds that about 90% of the hourly 
wage differentials between rural migrants and urban residents can be explained by 
skill differences (such as schooling, age and occupation). Altogether, the evidences 
above suggest that the predictions based on the proposition above offers upper limits 
for the log urban wages faced by all rural workers. The predictions would resemble 
more closely to their true values when the empirical findings in Xing (2008) could be 
of higher relevance to the reality. 
For the rest of this subsection, I apply the method proposed above to determining 
the pattern of migration selection in terms of log urban wages. Like many empirical 
studies, the earning function of urban blue-collar workers has the Mincerian 
specification (Mincer, 1974).81 In keeping with the discussion in Section 6.2.2, the 
dependent variable of the earning function is the log annual wage in the currency 
value 2009. The explanatory variables always include a linear term of schooling, a 
quadratic term of working experience and a gender dummy. In addition, the functions 
                                               
80 I have no intention to deny the existence of discrimination in the workplace. Nevertheless, Meng and 
Zhang (2001) may exaggerate its importance: In inequality decomposition exercises, shares larger than 
100% could often imply that some mistakes occur. In addition, it makes little sense to attribute all of 
the unexplained intra-occupational wage differentials to the discrimination. The unexplained wage 
differentials may only measure our ignorance about the wage determination. 
81 Readers may see Card (1999) and Lemieux (2006) for interesting and sympathetic reappraisals on 
the Mincerian function. 
 87 
 
may or may not include provincial dummies, depending on the concrete specification. 
As a baseline, the outputs of the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) are presented in the 
first and second columns of Table 6.6. Moreover, to mitigate the ability biases in the 
OLS estimations, regressions in the third and fourth columns include parents’ 
education as additional controls.82,83 
Year Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 
Schooling 0.02 0.02* 0.02 0.02 
Exper 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 
Exper2/100 -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
Female -0.19* -0.20* -0.20* -0.20* 
1993 
Schooling 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Exper 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.02* 
Exper2/100 -0.05* -0.05* -0.04* -0.03 
Female -0.15* -0.15* -0.15* -0.16* 
1997 
Schooling -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Exper 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 
Exper2/100 -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.08* 
Female -0.26* -0.26* -0.28* -0.28* 
2000 
Schooling 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Exper 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 
Exper2/100 -0.04* -0.04* -0.05* -0.05* 
Female -0.18* -0.18* -0.17* -0.18* 
2004 
Schooling 0.03 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Exper 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 
Exper2/100 -0.04* -0.05* -0.03 -0.05* 
Female -0.33* -0.33* -0.34* -0.33* 
2006 
Schooling 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.05* 
Exper 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Exper2/100 -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 
Female -0.44* -0.44* -0.44* -0.45* 
2009 
Schooling 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 
Exper 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.03* 
Exper2/100 -0.07* -0.08* -0.05* -0.07* 
Female -0.32* -0.34* -0.35* -0.37* 
 
Table 6.6: Earning Functions of the Urban Blue-Collar Workers 
 
Note the specification (1) does not include provincial dummies and father’s education; the specification 
(2) includes provincial dummies, but it excludes father’s education; the specification (3) excludes 
provincial dummies, but includes father’s education; the specification (4) includes both provincial 
                                               
82 The Instrumental Variable (IV) method is one of the leading methods used to mitigate the ability 
bias. However, after trying various instruments proposed in Card (1999), I find that most of these 
instruments are too weak to provide any reliable result for the data at hand. For example, schooling- 
proximity-related variables, such as the accessibility of schools to communities, distances between 
community and schools are proven to be weak instruments. The quarter of birth instrument advocated 
by Angrist and Krueger (1992) may suffer the weak instrument problem more severely in the Chinese 
context, mainly because the compulsory education law in China requires all students remain enrolled at 
school until they complete junior high school education, rather than until they are 16 years old. 
83 Missing parental education is imputed using the community level average whenever possible. 
Considering that the educational attainments vary across age cohorts, the community averages of 
parental education are calculated within each of the 10-year-age cohorts. In all of the regressions 
controlling for parental educations, imputation flags and interactions between parental educations and 
imputation flags are also included. 
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dummies and father’s education. The standard errors are robust and clustered at community level. * 
indicates significance at 5% level. Father’s education refers to father’s schooling, imputation flags, and 
interaction between father’s schooling and flags. I have also experimented to use mother’s schooling or 
both parents’ schooling as controls. Results are in general robust to these controls. 
 
Among all regression outputs above, two regularities are of particular interest for 
further empirical explorations: (1) the rate of return to schooling rises abruptly in the 
period between 2000 and 2004. The rate before this short period is extremely low in 
size and is often not statistically different from zero, while the rate after this period 
stabilizes. (2) The explanatory power of the Mincerian earning functions is limited in 
the sense that the adjusted R2 never exceeds 0.20. The average adjusted R2 is around 
0.10.84 The low goodness of fit could cause downwards bias in estimating of the key 
parameter 1 0( / )  . 
Given the earning functions of urban blue-collar workers, I can predict the log 
urban wages faced by all rural workers. By comparing the average predicted values of 
log urban wages faced by migratory and staying rural workers, I can finally determine 
the pattern of migration selection in terms of log urban wages. 
Both panels of Table 6.7 below suggest that on average migratory rural workers 
have caught up with and then overtaken their staying counterpart in terms of log urban 
wages. However, the timing of overtaking cannot be uniquely determined and it 
depends on concrete specification in estimation. If the timing of overtaking is defined 
as the year when sign of Δ changes for the first time to non-negative, then for 
regressions without controlling for parents’ education, the overtaking occurs around 
the middle 1990s, while for regressions controlling for parents’ education, the 
overtaking occurs around 2000. In addition, the intensity of migration selection in 
terms of log urban wage is low in general. For instance, the most negative entry in 
Table 6.7 is only -0.13, whereas the most positive entry in the same table is 0.17. 
                                               
84 In the U.S. literature, the adjusted R2 of the standard Mincerian earning function is often about 1/3. 
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Year 
(1) (2) 
Migratory Staying Δ Migratory Staying Δ 
1991 7.95 8.05 -0.10 7.94 8.04 -0.10 
1993 8.13 8.21 -0.08 8.13 8.19 -0.06 
1997 8.53 8.52 0.01 8.47 8.46 0.01 
2000 8.83 8.80 0.03 8.77 8.74 0.03 
2004 9.03 9.00 0.03 8.96 8.92 0.04 
2006 9.03 8.90 0.13 8.98 8.85 0.13 
2009 9.34 9.18 0.16 8.33 8.16 0.17 
Panel A: Before controlling for Fathers’ Education 
 
Year 
(3) (4) 
Migratory Staying Δ Migratory Staying Δ 
1991 7.93 8.06 -0.13 7.91 8.04 -0.13 
1993 8.13 8.26 -0.13 8.12 8.23 -0.11 
1997 8.50 8.57 -0.07 8.44 8.50 -0.06 
2000 8.82 8.82 0.00 8.76 8.77 -0.01 
2004 9.04 9.06 -0.02 8.97 8.97 0.00 
2006 9.08 8.94 0.14 9.03 8.90 0.13 
2009 9.32 9.26 0.06 9.31 9.23 0.08 
Panel B: After controlling for Father’ Education 
 
Table 6.7: Migration Selection in terms of Log Urban Wages 
 
Note that the details on specifications (1) - (4) are given in the notes below Table 6.6. The definition of 
Δ is given in notes below Table 6.5. 
 
Up to this point, I always maintain the assumption that all skill components are 
perfectly transferable across sectors. For skill components like working experience, 
however, this assumption may not be realistic. To be specific, experience collected 
from agricultural activities may depreciate in urban sector. 85  As a result, the 
conventional measure of working experience, i.e. years since the entry in the labor 
market after leaving school could be inaccurate in estimating of the log urban wages 
faced by rural workers. Because staying rural workers tend to be older, less educated, 
and thus more experienced in agriculture than migratory rural workers, previous 
estimates of log urban wages faced by staying rural workers could suffer more from 
inaccurate measurement of experience. To account for the imperfect transferability of 
experience, it is ideally to adjust the estimated log urban wages of staying rural 
workers and, to a lesser extent for those of rural migratory workers downwards. 
                                               
85 For a highly relevant discussion in the international migration context, reader may see Borjas (2003), 
Section VI.A. 
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Nevertheless, as long as the adjustments are not too big, the pattern of selection in 
terms of log urban wages would remain qualitatively unchanged, though the time 
point of overtaking could shift to an earlier year. 
To conclude Section 6.2, we need to combine empirical evidences presented in 
Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 to determine the overall pattern of migration selection. Based 
on these evidences, it is found that in the period 1991-2009, the pattern of migration 
selection in rural China may undergo two transitions. The overall pattern of migration 
selection in the early and middle 1990s is the negative sorting, because in this period, 
rural migratory workers tend to be outperformed on average by staying rural workers 
in both sectors. In the period around 2000, the overall pattern of migration selection 
changes to the non-hierarchical sorting, because in this period, migratory rural 
workers are still outperformed by staying rural workers in agriculture, but rural 
migratory workers start to outperform rural staying workers in the urban sector. In the 
middle and late 2000s, the overall pattern of migration selection changes to the 
positive sorting, because in this period, rural migratory workers tend to outperform 
staying rural workers in both sectors. Though the timing of transitions depend on 
concrete specification and cannot be determined precisely, these findings are likely to 
be qualitatively robust. 
6.3 Testing Theory with the CHNS Data: Puzzle and Explanations 
Based on the knowledge on the patterns of migration selection in three sub-periods 
mentioned above, the extended Roy model in Chapter 4 predicts that in the first and 
third sub-periods, out-migration tends to decrease and increase rural inequality, while 
in the second sub-period, the direction of impacts of out-migration on rural inequality 
is unclear. These theoretical predictions are exactly what this section aims at testing 
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for using the CHNS data. The tests and associating discussions below demonstrate 
that the extended Roy model and CHNS data could disagree about the role of 
intersectoral wage gap in determining the rural inequality. I offer thus several 
explanations for the disagreement near the end of this section. 
6.3.1 Empirically Testable Implications 
Before testing the predictions, it is necessary to realize a tension between theory 
prediction and data: The extended Roy model in Chapter 4 and virtually all other 
theoretical models in this thesis are static or comparative static in the sense that the 
time factor does not enter them explicitly. By contrast, the data with which the theory 
is tested are collecting from a highly dynamic world. To facilitate appropriate 
empirical tests, we need to modify these theoretical predictions so that they are in 
principle empirically testable. To be concrete, as in Section 6.2, it is straightforward to 
determine the pattern of migration selection from the data. However, the empirical 
counterpart for another key theoretical concept, i.e. the change of rural inequality RV 
remains unclear and thus requires additional efforts. 
Further analysis makes clear that in order to preserve the relationships between 
the pattern of migration selection and the direction of change of rural inequality in 
Chapter 4, the empirical counterpart of RV must take the form as follows 
 
 
, 0 0 1(log | ) / (log | ), log max{log , log }.V t t tR Var w Var w  where w w w     (6.7) 
The numerator in equation (6.7) measures the actual rural inequality at the time t, 
where the conditions t  denote the vector of distributional parameters at that time. 
The denominator measures the rural inequality in a counterfactual scenario in which 
all rural workers were engaged full-time in agriculture even when the opportunities of 
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urban employments were already available for them. Therefore, RV, t refers to the 
change of rural inequality in comparison with that in the counterfactual scenario. 
6.3.2 Empirical Tests and Some Disagreements 
 
Figure 6.1: Roadmap of Empirical Tests 
As preparation for the empirical tests, I construct measures of the change of rural 
inequality RV, t defined by equation (6.7) using the data of log shadow wages faced by 
rural workers in both sectors.86 The signs of RV, t -1 suggest the directions of change 
of rural inequality: Positive sign indicates increase in rural inequality. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 1.43 1.33 1.40 1.31 
1993 2.09 1.41 2.06 1.39 
1997 2.52 2.06 2.44 2.01 
2000 2.17 1.68 2.15 1.67 
2004 3.18 2.08 3.18 2.09 
2006 2.58 0.97 2.68 1.01 
2009 2.12 1.89 2.08 1.87 
 
Table 6.8: Constructed RV, t 
 
Note that in constructing RV, t in the first column, the log agricultural wages are predicted using the 
specification in Table 6.5, the left panel; the log urban wages are predicted using the same empirical 
specification in Table 6.7, Panel A, the second column. For RV, t in the second column, the log 
                                               
86 The denominator of RV, t measures the counterfactual rural inequality when all rural workers would 
work full-time in agriculture, which provides a reference to the actual rural inequality in the same year. 
Tabulation of predicted log agricultural wages faced by rural workers does not show any clear trend in 
it. The quantile regressions that are robust to outliers confirm this finding. 
Migration Selection 
 
(Section 6.2) 
Constructed 
 
Inequality Change 
 
Predicted 
 
Inequality Change 
Predicted Value of 
 
Log Wages 
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(Section 6.3.2) 
Chapter 4 
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agricultural wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.5, the right panel; the log urban 
wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.7, Panel A, the second column. For RV, t in the 
third column, the log agricultural wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.5, the left panel; 
the log urban wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.7, Panel B, the second column. For 
RV, t in the fourth column, the log agricultural wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.5, 
the right panel; the log urban wages are predicted using the specification in Table 6.7, Panel B, the 
second column. 
 
Unlike the theoretical predictions based on knowledge of pattern of selection, 
Table 6.8 points out that out-migration nearly always increases the rural inequality. 
Therefore, for the first sub-period in the early and middle 1990s, there is an obvious 
disagreement between theoretical predictions and empirical results in Table 6.8, since 
the pattern in that sub-period is negative sorting, which implies that rural inequality 
should decrease instead. 
To understand the reasons why theory and data sometimes disagree, I decompose 
the difference between the numerator and denominator of RV, t using the law of total 
variance such that 
 
1 0
0 0
2
1 0
2
0 0
( )
Pr( 1)[ (log | 1) (log | 1]
Pr( 0)[ (log | 0) (log | 0]
Pr( 1) Pr( 0){[ (log | 1) (log | 0)]
[ (log | 1) (log | 0)] }
( ) ( ) 0 ( ).
  Var total
I Var w I Var w I
I Var w I Var w I
I I E w I E w I
E w I E w I
Sh m Var m Var between

    
    
     
   
      
(6.8) 
The decomposition results under various specifications are given in Table 6.9. 
  ΔVar(total) Sh(m)ΔVar (m) Sh (s)ΔVar (s) ΔVar (between) 
1991 0.168  -0.025  -0.002  0.196  
1993 0.689  -0.073  -0.004  0.766  
1997 0.400  -0.024  -0.003  0.427  
2000 0.403  -0.035  -0.013  0.451  
2004 1.507  -0.136  -0.010  1.653  
2006 0.761  -0.124  -0.018  0.904  
2009 0.460  -0.126  -0.018  0.604  
Panel A: Specification (1) 
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  ΔVar (total) Sh (m)ΔVar (m) Sh (s)ΔVar (s) ΔVar (between) 
1991 0.162  -0.031  -0.002  0.195  
1993 0.358  -0.129  -0.006  0.492  
1997 0.425  -0.037  -0.005  0.467  
2000 0.298  -0.043  -0.016  0.357  
2004 0.630  -0.109  -0.009  0.747  
2006 -0.014  -0.142  -0.018  0.145  
2009 0.520  -0.170  -0.029  0.719  
Panel B: Specification (2) 
 
  ΔVar (total) Sh (m)ΔVar (m) Sh (s)ΔVar (s) ΔVar (between) 
1991 0.156  -0.026  0.000  0.182  
1993 0.664  -0.073  -0.001  0.738  
1997 0.380  -0.024  -0.003  0.407  
2000 0.395  -0.035  -0.013  0.443  
2004 1.511  -0.136  -0.009  1.656  
2006 0.877  -0.126  -0.017  1.019  
2009 0.445  -0.128  -0.017  0.590  
Panel C: Specification (3) 
 
  ΔVar (total) Sh (m)ΔVar (m) Sh (s)ΔVar (s) ΔVar (between) 
1991 0.151  -0.031  0.000  0.182  
1993 0.343  -0.129  -0.002  0.474  
1997 0.404  -0.037  -0.004  0.446  
2000 0.291  -0.043  -0.016  0.350  
2004 0.636  -0.108  -0.008  0.752  
2006 0.006  -0.143  -0.016  0.166  
2009 0.504  -0.172  -0.027  0.703  
Panel D: Specification (4) 
 
Table 6.9: Decomposition using the Law of Total Variance 
 
The notations Sh (m) and Sh (s) denote shares of migratory and staying rural workers, ΔVar (m) and 
ΔVar (s) denote differences of variances within subgroups of migratory and staying rural workers, 
while ΔVar (between) denote the difference of between-group variance. Note that owing to missing 
values and rounding errors, values of Sh (s)ΔVar (s) in the table are not exactly zero. 
 
Without exception, all decompositions in Table 6.9 attribute the majority of the 
increase in overall rural inequality to the increase in between-group variance captured 
by the large and positive ΔVar(between). Furthermore, considering that the intensities 
of migration selection in terms of log wages in both sectors are usually low, the 
expression of ΔVar(between) can be further approximated without much loss of the 
precision as follows 
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 21 0( ) Pr( 1) Pr( 0)( ) .Var between I I        (6.9) 
Therefore, the decompositions above identify the large intersectoral wage gap as 
the primary source of the increase in rural inequality reported in Table 6.8. 
    Nevertheless, as we already know,87 the Roy models in general reject such a 
possibility entirely for the reason that in that model a large intersectoral wage gap 
tends to result in a large and instantaneous migration that suffices to narrow the wage 
gap. Thus, for the Roy models a large intersectoral wage gap 1 0( / )   cannot be a 
major determinant of the change of rural inequality RV, t. This is exactly the point at 
which theory and data disagree. 
  By examining the data closely, however, there is no evidence that supports the 
presumption of the extended Roy model that large intersectoral wage gap does result 
in migration that is large enough to narrow the wage gap effectively. In fact, the 
shares of migratory workers among all rural workers in the CHNS data are often low. 
Even in the CHNS 2009, this share is still below 40%. As a result, the remaining 
intersectoral wage gap continues to affect the overall rural inequality. 
  To summarize, the discussions above demonstrate that the disagreement between 
theory and data could lie ultimately in an old puzzle in literature, namely given the 
large observed intersectoral wage gap, why so little migration occurs. 
6.3.3 Possible Explanations 
  At the end of this section, I offer several possible explanations for the puzzle of 
missing intersectoral migration mentioned above and hence for the disagreement 
                                               
87 See particularly Figure 4.1. 
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between theory and data. These explanations are largely complimentary to each other. 
  The first group of explanations associate with data issues that could cause 
upwards biases in estimation of the intersectoral wage gap 1 0( / )  .
88 Suppose that 
the true value of 1 0( / )   is significantly lower than its current estimate, the 
magnitude of observed migration can be legitimate. The over-estimates of 1 0( / )   
could also contribute to the increasing rural inequality reported in Table 6.8. 
  Firstly, as argued before, because of the large amount of measurement errors in 
constructed working hours, current estimates of 1 0( / )   have to rely on predicted 
log annual wages of rural workers when they were employed in both sectors. Suppose 
that typical workers in both sectors differ significantly in their annual working hours, 
current estimates of 1 0( / )   would offer misleading measures for the intersectoral 
hourly wage gap, which relates more directly to the migration decision. Indeed, as 
demonstrated by Table 6.10 below, a typical urban employee in the CHNS data works 
per year about twice as long as a typical agricultural worker does. 
 
 
                                               
88 Other data issues could lead to imprecise estimates of parameter 
1 0
( / )  . Particularly, given the 
low goodness of fit of the Mincerian regressions of urban blue-collar workers, inferring the true *
1
  by 
using the standard deviation of the predicted log urban wages faced by rural workers 
1

 
could lead to 
downwards bias. For example, suppose the adjusted 2 2 * 2
1 1
/ ( / ) 0.1R R SSE SST     - the value 
that most adjusted R2 take, the true standard deviation *
1 1 1
/ 0.1 3    . In other words, if similar 
biases in inferring 
0
  is ignorable, values of 
1 0
( / )   need multiplying by a factor 3 to correct for 
the downwards bias caused by the low goodness of fit in Mincerian regressions. The corrected 
1 0
( / )   between 1991 and 2004 (except 1997) would be still smaller than or equal to 1. However, the 
values of true 
1 0
( / )   in years 2006 and 2009 would exceed 1. In both years, the values of true 
1 0
( / ) 
 
do not violate the sufficient and necessary conditions of the patterns of migration selection. 
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  Urban Rural Urban/Rural 
1991 2455.48  1520.34  1.62  
1993 2419.25  1291.87  1.87  
1997 2189.58  1209.22  1.81  
2000 2174.89  1023.47  2.13  
2004 2227.63  1017.77  2.19  
2006 2271.97  914.92  2.48  
2009 2237.08  812.42  2.75  
 
Table 6.10: Differences in Annual Working Hours 
 
Note that the first column entitled “Urban” reports the average annual working hours of urban workers. 
The second column entitled “Rural” reports the average annual working hours of agricultural workers. 
The third column reports the ratios between annual working hours of urban and agricultural workers in 
each year. To avoid outliers, only working hours of employees who work less than 4000 hours per year 
are included in the tabulation. 
 
  Secondly, if discrimination plays a role in the wage determination within urban 
occupations, as asserted by some empirical literature, the predicted log urban wages 
faced by rural workers obtained from Section 6.2.3 offer only upper limits for their 
true values. Consequently, the current estimates of 1 0( / )   tend to be upwards 
biased as well. 
  After correcting for the upwards biases introduced by data issues, the new 
estimates of 1 0( / )   should be lower than their current values and thus the puzzle 
of missing migration could be in part resolved. Nevertheless, the corrected wage gap 
would remain substantial: Prior to any correction, the average level of urban wages 
faced by all rural workers ( 1e ) is about eight to ten times as large as that of the 
agricultural wages faced by the same population ( 0e ).89 After accounting for the 
                                               
89 In Lewis (1954), he mentions once to use the Average Product of Labor (APL) in agriculture as the 
opportunity cost for rural-to-urban migration. In his words, “in economies where the majority of the 
people are peasant farmers, working on their own land, we have a more objective index, for the 
minimum at which labour can be had is now set by the average product of the farmer (pp. 148-9) ”. 
However, Lewis does not work out the model. Hu (1994) argues that in the post-reform China where 
rural households are de facto owners of the land they cultivate and thus own (the majority of) the 
agricultural incomes attributable to both land and labor inputs, the APL is likely to be a superior 
measure for their members’ incomes. APL could also be a superior measure for the opportunity cost, if 
rural migrants give up their rights to share the rentals with staying members. To see this point, 
assuming that the agricultural technology takes the Cobb-Douglas form such that Y=TA(0)αL1-α. We 
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difference of annual working hours between workers in both sectors, the ratio would 
be still around four to five. It is hard to believe that discrimination within urban 
occupations alone can explain the rest of intersectoral wage gap. 
For the large corrected intersectoral wage gap, the puzzle of missing migration 
and thus the disagreement between theory and data continue to exist. Therefore, more 
efforts are required to explain them. In what follows, I provide three further possible 
explanations for them. 
The first explanation emphasizes the role of large yet unobserved migration costs. 
A typical reaction of economists to the puzzle of missing migration would be to 
assume the existence of unobserved migration costs that prevents rural-to-urban 
migration in response to the large intersectoral wage gap, although the economists 
know little about the sources, magnitude and its functional form of the migration costs. 
In the presence of migration costs, the effective inter-sectoral wage gap faced by rural 
workers can be reduced. Hence, fewer rural workers find profitable to out-migrate. 
Furthermore, even if migration can narrow the effective intersectoral wage gap 
                                                                                                                                      
obtain APL=Y/L=MPL+MPA×A(0)/L=MPL/(1-α). Estimations on the agricultural value-added functions 
suggest that α – the share of land input in the total value-added is often smaller than 1/2. Hence, we 
have MPL<APL<2MPL. Particularly, when α=1/2, APL=2MPL; when α=1/3, APL=1.5MPL. 
If I follow Hu’s suggestion to use APL to measure the income of agricultural workers, then the 
intersectoral wage gap can be further narrowed. After adjusting for the sectoral difference in annual 
working hours and then using APL to measure the agricultural income, the average wage in the urban 
sector would be only about three times as large as the average APL. The corrected wage gap is roughly 
comparable to the ratio between the average disposable income of urban residents and average per 
capita net household income of rural residents routinely reported in the official statistics of China (see 
for example, China Compendium of Statistics, 1949-2008, Table 1-23, “Per Capita Annual Income, 
Expenditure and Engle Coefficient of Urban and Rural Households”). Note that the net household 
income is obtained by subtracting the monetary value of all material inputs from the gross agricultural 
outputs and thus consists of both labor income and land rental. Therefore, the official statistics provide 
some supports to my estimates on the annual shadow wages in both sectors. 
Unfortunately, although I consider in the thesis the land ownership in China explicitly, similar to 
the standard Roy model, virtually all theoretical models in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are still neo-classical. 
Thus, profit- or income- maximization in these models requires more or less equality between urban 
wage and agricultural MPL, rather than that between urban wage and agricultural APL. It would be thus 
difficult, but important for the economists who are interested in the Chinese labor markets to think 
about ways to incorporate the APL as a variable directly relating to the decision-making of maximizing 
households into the neo-classical models. 
 99 
 
efficiently, it cannot narrow the observed wage gap owing to migration costs. Thus, 
the intersectoral wage gap owing to migration costs continues to affect the observed 
rural inequality. 
The second explanation stresses the fact that migration may lag well behind the 
changes of the economic environment, since many activities relating to migration, for 
example, financing for the migration, transportation, searching jobs and finding 
lodging at the destination may be time-consuming for rural workers and households. 
Therefore, different from what the extended Roy model assumes, migration in the 
reality is unlikely to adjust instantaneously in response to the changes of intersectoral 
wage gap 1 0( / )  . The existence of convex adjustment costs would further 
slowdown the out-migration. Consequently, the intersectoral wage gap tends to affect 
the overall rural inequality in a long period. Under this explanation, the observed 
staying rural workers may also include those who find out-migration profitable but are 
not well prepared for out-migration. 
The third explanation goes beyond the simple framework in which all households 
are assumed to be total-income-maximizers, which is maintained in all of the previous 
discussions. In a more general household utility-maximization framework, we may 
consider various non-pecuniary benefits and costs relating to migration that could 
affect the effective intersectoral wage gap perceived by rural workers and households. 
Notably, as documented in Table 6.10, a typical urban worker tends to work longer 
than a typical worker on household farms does. This finding implies that to be 
employed in the urban sector, rural workers have to sacrifice a large number of leisure 
and possibly, to accept more strict discipline in the workplace, both of which could 
lead to disutility and hence decrease in the perceived intersectoral wage gap. 
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More interestingly, by allowing for the income pooling between migratory and 
staying household members in household income-maximization framework to be 
imperfect, i.e. 0< 1  , we may be able to resolve to a considerable extent the puzzle 
of missing migration and hence the disagreement between theory and data. If in 
making migration decisions, maximizing rural households anticipate and take the 
imperfectness of income pooling into account, the effective intersectoral wage gap 
faced by rural households should be adjusted downwards accordingly. Smaller 
effective inter-sectoral wage gap could help to explain the puzzle of missing migration 
and hence the disagreement between theory and data. Another obvious advantage of 
adopting this slightly modified household income-maximization framework to studies 
of intersectoral migration and its impacts is that there will be no need to assume the 
equalization of wages earned from both sectors. The modified framework requires 
only that at the margin the agricultural wage equals to a fraction ( ) of the given 
urban wage. Thanks to this advantage, this modified framework could have a large 
potential for the theoretical and empirical explorations of the intersectoral migration 
in developing countries and its impacts on the source and destination. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the last chapter, I provide a brief summary on this thesis. Then I give some 
preliminary discussions on the policy implications of previous theoretical and 
empirical explorations. 
In theoretical chapters of this thesis, namely Chapters 2 to 5, I extend the 
standard Roy model by combining several simple microeconomic models capturing 
decisions of income-maximizing rural households subjective to constraints of factor 
endowments with the statistical framework of the standard Roy model. The extended 
Roy models have thus more solid microfoundations than the standard Roy model does. 
In particular, the extended Roy models are capable of taking the intra-household 
economic linkages that are totally missing in the standard Roy model into account. 
The extended Roy models do shed light on the source of the pre-migratory rural 
inequality. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between the standard and 
extended Roy models lies in the fact that they associate with two interrelated yet 
different statistical problems: As illustrated in Chapter 3, the former associates with 
the problem of truncation, whereas the latter associate with the problem of censoring. 
The difference in the statistical structure leads to different predictions about the 
impacts of out-migration on rural inequality. For example, in the setting where all 
labor inputs are homogeneous in household agricultural production, Chapter 3 shows 
clearly that although the extended Roy model predicts also a decreasing rural 
inequality, the predictions derived from both models differ quantitatively. In general, 
the extended Roy model predicts a smaller decrease in rural inequality than the 
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standard Roy model does. 
The difference in prediction becomes more apparent after introducing the labor 
heterogeneity. In the setting where labor inputs are heterogeneous and perfect 
substitutive in household agricultural production, Chapter 4 illustrates that out- 
migration could not only decrease, but also increase the rural inequality measured by 
the censored variance of log wages. Furthermore, by ignoring the effects that out- 
migration has on the productivity and wages of staying rural workers, it is found that 
there are non-causal relations between the pattern of migration selection and the 
direction of change of rural inequality. Particularly, out-migrations exhibiting positive 
sorting tend to coexist with increase in rural inequality; out-migrations exhibiting the 
negative sorting tend to coexist with decrease in rural inequality; the direction of 
change of rural inequality is unclear if out-migrations exhibit non-hierarchical sorting. 
Chapter 5 considers the impacts of out-migration on rural inequality in a more 
general setting where labor inputs are heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutive in 
household agricultural production. The discussion suggests that since one of the basic 
assumptions are violated in that setting, the Roy models in general stop to offer useful 
analytical framework for studying the impacts. 
Chapter 6 presents empirical findings supplementing the theoretical chapters. A 
few of them should be of interest for broader researches as well. 
Firstly, by estimating the production function of household farms, the results 
suggest that (1) the hypothesis that labor forces from different broadly defined 
education-age cells are perfect substitutes in household agricultural production cannot 
be rejected, and (2) heterogeneity in intrinsic productivity in agriculture gains its 
importance over time. These empirical findings together point out that the setting in 
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Chapter 4 as the most relevant setting. 
Secondly, to my knowledge, Chapter 6 is the first study that reports the finding 
that the pattern of selection in the Chinese rural-to-urban migration is likely to 
undergo two transitions during the period 1991-2009. The dominating pattern of 
migration selection changes from the negative sorting to the non-hierarchical sorting 
around the late 1990s, and it changes again from the non-hierarchical sorting to the 
positive sorting around the middle 2000s. The transitions imply that during that period, 
rural migratory workers on average have caught up with and eventually overtaken 
their staying counterparts in terms of potential log wages in both sectors. 
Because comparing to rural staying workers, the characteristics of migratory 
rural workers remain roughly stable, the overtaking of migratory rural workers should 
be chiefly explained by the changes of relative shadow prices of different skill 
components during the period.90 Notably, evidences in Chapter 6 makes clearly that 
schooling plays an increasingly important role in determining the log wages faced by 
rural workers in both sectors. Moreover, even in agricultural sector, where working 
experience is highly valued for the production, the importance of schooling may 
increases relative to working experience. 
Thirdly, for the first sub-period in the early and middle 1990s, the theoretical 
prediction based on knowledge of the pattern of migration selection could disagree 
with what data of predicted log shadow wages reveal. In that sub-period, the theory 
predicts a decrease in rural inequality (compared to the counterfactual inequality when 
                                               
90 Though there is no convincing evidence, it is still interesting to note that the timing of the two 
transitions, especially the second one coincides roughly with China’s entry to the WTO on December 
11, 2001. I suspect a freer access to the world economy owing to the entry to the WTO could response 
for the changes of the effective endowments of skills and other resources, the shadow prices and hence 
the pattern of migration selection. 
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all rural workers were engaged full-time in agriculture). By contrast, like in other sub- 
periods, the data suggest an increase in the rural inequality. 
Further explorations attribute much of the disagreement between theory and data 
to the puzzle of missing migration, which means that facing with a large intersectoral 
wage gap, migration is often smaller than what theory predicts and thus cannot narrow 
the wage gap effectively. To understand and resolve the puzzle, I propose several 
possible explanations. Aside from the two data issues, the following three reasons 
could have large potentials as further explanations, which include (1) the existence of 
unobserved yet sizable migration costs, (2) the time lags between the changes of 
economic environments and migration, and (3) the imperfectness of the income 
pooling between migratory and staying rural workers. Nevertheless, all of these 
explanations are preliminary. There is much to be done to clarify them and to 
determine the empirical relevance of them to the puzzle of missing migration and thus 
to the disagreement between theory and data. 
At the end of this thesis, I discuss the possible policy implications of previous 
theoretical and empirical chapters. 
The theoretical chapters do not have rich policy implications. This is mainly 
because most of relationships found in these chapters, especially the one between the 
pattern of migration selection and the direction of change of the rural inequality in 
Chapter 4 are not causal. Therefore, there would be little role for public policy. 
The empirical chapter, however, does have policy implications. For example, the 
discussion on the pattern of migration selection shows that on average rural migratory 
workers’ productivities in agriculture overtake those of rural staying workers, which 
suggests that it makes no longer sense to categorize rural migratory workers as the 
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surplus laborers in Lewis (1954). The out-migration since around the middle 2000s 
could have thus large negative impacts on the agricultural outputs in China. Therefore, 
to promote the growth of agriculture, rural households should have better accesses to 
the factor markets of non-labor inputs such as capital and material as well as to new 
agricultural technologies. The evidences highlight also the importance of schooling in 
determining the wages. Hence, public policies that improve educational attainments of 
rural workers would be highly desirable. Furthermore, Chapter 6 may suggest the 
existence of obstacles that keep rural workers from out-migration and integration in 
urban sector. Public policies that aim at removing these obstacles should to be 
implemented with courage and determination. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATHMATICAL APPENDIX 
In this appendix, I present mathematical derivations that are essential for a thorough 
understanding of the main text in Chapters 2 to 5.91 This appendix is organized as 
follows: Firstly, I recall the basic assumptions required for most derivations below. 
Next, based on these assumptions, I derive in some detail (1) the sufficient and 
necessary conditions for different patterns of migration selection and (2) the moments 
of truncated and censored normal distributions. At the end of this appendix, I explain 
the way in which the reservation wage of out-migration is constructed in Chapter 5. 
The basic assumptions are given in Section 2.1. In particular, they assert that the 
log sectoral wages faced by rural workers are jointly normal distributed, and that all 
rural workers are wage-income maximizers. 
Under these assumptions, I follow the classical treatment in Borjas (1987) to 
define three patterns of migration selection according to the signs of two selection 
biases, 0 0 0 1 0(log | log log )Q E w w w     and 1 1 0 1 1(log | log log )Q E w w w    . 
They measure differences in earning capacity between average rural out-migrants and 
the population of rural workers when they were employed in agricultural and non- 
agricultural sectors. By definition, the positive sorting occurs when both 0Q  and 1Q  
are positive, the negative sorting occurs when both 0Q  and 1Q  are negative, while 
the non-hierarchical sorting occurs when 0Q  is negative and 1Q  is positive. 
To determine the concrete conditions under which each of three patterns of 
                                               
91 In preparing the text and the Appendix A, I assume the readers have exposed to probability theory at 
the level roughly equivalent to Casella and Berger (2001). 
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migration selection occurs, I express 0Q  and 1Q  in terms of underlying 
distributional parameters. For example, 0Q  can be reformulated as 
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
(log | log log )
[ | ( )].
Q E w w w
E

    
  
    
 
Under the normality of 0  and 1 0  , 0  can be decomposed as its 
projection on 1 0   denoting by 1 0( )B    and a residual   that is orthogonal to 
1 0  , where B is the regression coefficient with 1 0 0 1 0( , ) / ( ).B Cov Var        
Thus, the equation above becomes 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
[ ( ) | ( )]
[ | ( )].
Q E B
BE
      
     
      
     
 
Now applying Theorem 24.2 in Greene (2007) gives 
01 1 0
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ),Q B c c c

  
     
 

       
where 2 1 0( ),Var      c is the standardized intersectoral wage gap defined as
1 0( ) / ,c       (.)  is the inverse Mills ratio defined as (.) (.) / [1 (.)]   . 
Likewise, another selection bias 1Q  can be reformulated as 
1 01 0
1 1 1( ) ( ).Q c c

  
   


     
Since the inverse Mills ratio (.)  is always positive, the signs of 0Q  and 1Q  
are determined only by the signs of   and  . For instance, for the positive sorting, 
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both   and   must be positive, which implies 0 1 01 1 0/ /      . Considering 
that 01  is a correlation coefficient and thus cannot exceed 1, we have 0 1  . 
Hence, the sufficient and necessary conditions for the positive sorting are given by 
equation (2.3) in the form of 01 0 1/    and 0 1  . Similarly, we obtain the 
conditions for the negative sorting and the non-hierarchical sorting given by equations 
(2.4) and (2.5). 
In the standard Roy model, the post-migratory inequality in source sector is 
conventionally measured by the truncated variance 0 0 1(log | log log )Var w w w . 
Under the joint normality assumption, I prove equation (2.6) stating that the truncated 
variance must be smaller than pre-truncated variance below. 
0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0
2
0 1 0 1 1 0
   (log | log log )
( | )
[ ( ) | ]
[ | ] ( ).
Var w w w
Var
Var B
B Var Var
    
      
      

   
      
     
 
According to Theorem 24.2 in Greene (2007), the first right-hand side term in the 
equation above equals to 2 2 2 20[1 ( )] [1 ( )]B c c         and the second right-hand 
term 2 20 0 1 0( ) [ ( )] (1 ).Var Var B           Thus 
2 2
0 0 1 0(log | log log ) [1 ( )]Var w w w c     . 
Since 0 ( ) 1c   for all c,   is a correlation coefficient and thus | | 1  , we 
obtain equation (2.6) in the form 20 0 1 0 0(log | log log ) (log ).Var w w w Var w    
Using the same procedure yields the following formulas for the truncated means 
and variances of normal distribution that are useful in equations (4.19) and (4.20): 
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2 2
0 0 1 0(log | log log ) [1 ( )]E w w w c     ; 
2 2
1 0 1 1(log | log log ) [1 ( )]E w w w c      ; 
0 0 1 0 0(log | log log ) ( )Var w w w c     ; 
1 0 1 1 1(log | log log ) ( )Var w w w c      . 
By applying the law of total variance, the censored variance (log )Var w  can be 
decomposed as the sum of within- and between-group variances, just as what equation 
(4.19) shows. Inserting formulas for the truncated moments into equation (4.19) gives 
equation (4.20). 
Finally, I show the way in which one can construct the log reservation wage 
log ( ,...)rw s  faced by rural workers when they make migration decisions. 
I start by considering the first row of the complimentary-slackness conditions 
given by equation (5.1), which describes the optimal decisions made by partially 
migratory types of rural workers in the rural household of interest. 
# 0
# 0
1 1# #
0 0
#
#
1 #
0
0
#
1
#
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
log ( ) log log[ ]
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
log ( ) log log[ ].
( ) ( )
     L s L s
q s L s q s L s
q t L t dt q t L t dt
q s L s
T s a
q t L t dt
q s L s
T s a
q t L t dt
 
 











 

  

  
 


 
Note that the left-hand side term in the last line of equation above is just 
#log ( ,...)MPL s . The right-hand side term is the log reservation wage, or say, the log 
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opportunity costs of out-migration that I attempt to construct, because it measures the 
log agricultural wages that any migratory type of workers could earn if they would 
stay, while all other types of workers would behave optimally. Since for these partially 
migratory types of rural workers, we also have # 1log ( ,...) log ( )MPL s w s , the first 
row of equation (5.1) can be rewritten as 
# # 0
1log ( ,...) max{log ( ,...), log ( )},   ( ) ( ).
rMPL s w s w s if L s L s   
Similarly, starting with the second row of equation (5.1), which describes the 
optimal decision made by staying types of rural workers, we obtain 
# 0
0
# #
1 #
0
    ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( )
log ( ,...) log ( ) log log[ ],
( ) ( )
L s L s
q s L s
MPL s T s a
q t L t dt







   

 
where the right-hand side term is again the log reservation wage log ( ,...)rw s . Since 
their agricultural labor inputs remain unchanged in the course of out-migration, i.e. 
# 0( ) ( )L s L s , log ( ,...)rw s  measures the actual log agricultural wages earned by 
staying types of rural workers. Moreover, according to equation (5.1), we have for the 
staying labor types # 1log ( ,...) log ( )MPL s w s . Hence, the second row of equation 
(5.1) can be rewritten as 
# # 0
1log ( ,...) max{log ( ,...), log ( )},   ( ) ( ).
rMPL s w s w s if L s L s   
Collecting the rewritten complimentary-slackness conditions for all types of rural 
workers gives equation (5.5) such that 
#
1log ( ,...) max{log ( ,...), log ( )},  .
rMPL s w s w s s   
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APPENDIX B 
INDIRECT EVIDENCE ON THE PREVELENCE  
OF THE PARTIAL OUT-MIGRATION 
This appendix provides indirect evidences on the prevalence of partial out-migration 
in post-reform Chinese context. 
The proof starts with a well-established fact in literature, namely percentages of 
migratory households, i.e. households with at least one migratory worker are usually 
higher than percentages of migratory workers in the same samples. Perhaps the best 
guess of the ratio between both percentages in literature is about two.92 In what 
follows, I use the proof by contradiction to argue that this fact can be interpreted as 
indirect evidence for the prevalence of partial out-migration in the Chinese context. 
Let us think about a scenario in which the following assumptions are satisfied: 
(1) There are N-households in the rural community before migration. The 
number of members in each of the households is given by , 1, 2,...,ih  i N . For 
simplicity, I assume all household members belong to the labor force. 
(2) M of N households ( 0 M N  ) participate in rural-to-urban migration 
in the sense that at least one member in each of these households out-migrates. 
They are called henceforth as the migratory households. 
(3) Suppose that only complete family migration is possible. In other words, 
all members of a household make the same migration decision. This will serve as 
                                               
92 See for example, Zhao (1997), Zhao (1999b), Du and Park (2003). For a more complete review on 
this issue, readers may refer to Lu (2008), Appendix Table 3. 
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the null hypothesis ( 0H ) to be tested. 
Under the scenario above, the percentage of migratory households in the rural 
community is given by /M N , while the percentage of migratory members is given 
by 
1 1
/
M N
j ij i
h h
   . The percentage of migratory members can be rewritten as 
11
1 1
1
1
MM
jjj jj
N N iii ii
hh M M hM
N N hh h
N

 
 

 
 
To ensure that the percentage of migratory households is much higher than that 
of migratory workers, we have 
,
j
i j
i
M M h
,  h h
N N h
     
which suggests that the average size of migratory households ( jh ) should be 
sufficiently smaller than the average size of all households in the rural community. 
If we accept the best guess on the relation between two percentages, then 
1
2 , ,
2
j
j i
i
M M h
  h h
N N h
     
which means the average size of migratory households should be about one half as 
large as that of all households in the community. To my knowledge, no literature has 
ever documented such a big difference between the average sizes of two types of 
households in the same community. 
Therefore, the fact that percentage of migratory households is significantly larger 
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than corresponding percentage of migratory members is likely to provide evidence 
against the null hypothesis given by (3). Consequently, alternative hypothesis ( 1H ) 
stating that not all the migrations are complete family migration must be accepted. 
Nevertheless, accepting 1H  does not mean automatically that the partial 
migration is the prevailing form of migration in the Chinese context – An alternative 
hypothesis that is stronger than 1H . Hereafter, I call this stronger alternative 
hypothesis as '1H . To prove that 
'
1H  should be accepted, I consider a slightly 
different scenario in which assumptions (1) and (2) listed above are maintained, while 
the assumption (3) is replaced by a new one as follows: 
(3’) Not all migrations are family migration. Among M-migratory households, 
pM of them migrate partially, while the rest of them engage in family migration. 
For households in the first subgroup, the numbers of members are given by 
, 1,...,jh j pM  and the numbers of migratory members are given by 
, 1,...,jl j pM . Obviously, we have 0 ,j jl h j   . For households in the 
second subgroup, the numbers of members are given by ,kh  1,...,(1 )k p M   
and the numbers of migratory members are given by k kl h , 1,...,(1 )k p M  . 
Under new assumptions (1) (2) and (3’), the percentage of migratory households 
is still given by /M N , while that of migratory members is now given by 
(1 )
1 1
1
(1 )
pM p M
j k j kj k
N
i
ii
l l pM l p M l
Nhh

 

  

 

. 
In order to have 
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(1 ) 1 (1 )
2
2
j k j k
i i
M pMl p M l pl p l
,  
N Nh h
   
    . 
It is clear that 0 j jl h   and k kl h . To facilitate further discussion, I define 
, (0,1)j jl h     , where   denotes average fraction of migratory members in the 
partially migratory households. 
Substituting j jl h  and k kl h  into previous equation gives 
1 (1 )
2
j k
i
p h p h
h
  
  . 
If the average sizes measured by amount of household members are roughly the 
same for the partially, family migratory households and staying households, i.e. 
j k ih h h  , then the equation above can be further simplified as 
1
(1 )
2
p p    . 
Thus, for any given (0,1)  , we have 
1 1 1
2 21
p

 

. Moreover, since p is a 
probability, 1p   must hold and thus 1
2
  . 
To conclude, the results above suggest that within the migratory households, the 
share of partially migratory households is likely to exceed 1/2, which could be 
interpreted as a supportive evidence of the alternative hypothesis '1H  stating that the 
partial out-migration prevails in the Chinese rural-to-urban migration. Furthermore, 
the last equation may suggest among all partially migratory households, the average 
fraction of migratory members is likely to be low. 
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APPENDIX C 
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS FOR PARAMETERS {q(s)} 
The main purpose of this appendix is to provide clear economic interpretations for the 
set of parameters { ( )}q s  associating with different types of labor inputs in the CES 
production function. As will be shown below, these parameters relate closely to the 
marginal products of different labor inputs when total labor inputs are balanced in 
quality. With some stretches, these parameters relate also to the intrinsic skills of 
different labor inputs. The reason why I emphasize the term “intrinsic” is that the 
scarcity of inputs could also affect labor inputs’ marginal products. By insisting on 
evaluating marginal products of labor at balanced labor-input-bundles, the impacts of 
the scarcity on the marginal products can be partialled out. 
To simplify the following discussion, I consider a simple two-level nested CES 
production function such as93 
1
1/
1 1 2 2 1 2
           ,
 ( ) ,  with    1.
y TA QL
where QL q L q L q q
 
  

   
 
In what follows, I reconsider the economic interpretation for 1 2( , )q q  that has 
often been vaguely understood as terms reflecting the skill-specific technical changes. 
Since the production function is nonlinear, I approximate it using its first- and 
second order Taylor’s series. I begin by considering a simpler case in which the 
production function is approximated as a first-order Taylor’s series around 10 20( , )L L . 
                                               
93 The discussion based on the simple two-level nested CES specification could be extended easily to 
the cases when the two-level nested CES specification with more than two labor inputs involves. After 
some modifications, this discussion would also shed light on the cases when the more complex nested 
CES specifications involve. 
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1 (1 ) /
1 1 2 2( )y TA QL TA q L q L
         
 
Taking natural logarithms gives 
1 1 2 2
(1 ) (1 )
log log log log( ) log log .y T A q L q L A g 
 
  
 
 
        
Approximating this equation using the first-order Taylor’s expansion yields 
0 0
0 1 10 2 20
1 2
0 01 2
0
1 10 20
log log1
log log [log ( ) ( )]
log log1
log [log log( ) log( )],
log log
g g
y A g L L L L
L L
g gL L
A g
L L L L

 


 

 
      
 
 
    
 
 
where 0 1 10 2 20log log( )g q L q L
    and 0
1 1 2 2
log
,  1,2
log
s s
s
g q L
s
L q L q L

 

  
 
. 
In particular, if the expansion point 10 20( , )L L  is chosen such that it locates 
along the ray 20 10 ,  0L L     , then a greatly simplified expression of log y  
can be obtained as follows 
1 1 2 2
(1 )
log log log log (1 )( log log )y A g A q L q L

    


        . 
Taking partial derivatives gives the expressions for the parameters 1 2( , )q q : 
1 1
1
2 2
2
1 log 1
;
1 log 1
1 log 1
,
1 log 1
y
y
y
q
L
y
q
L

 

 

 
  

 
  
 
where 1y  and 2y  denote the elasticities of output with respect to 1L  and 2L . 
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Moreover, suppose the labor inputs are balanced in quality in the sense that 
1 2L L , the relationship between parameters 1q  and 2q  have a clear economic 
interpretation. Without losing generality, if it is found that 1 2q q , then according to 
the discussions above, we know 1 2y y  . Furthermore, since the elasticities are 
defined as 
log
log
s s
ys s
s s
L Ly y
MPL
L y L y

 
  
 
, 1 2q q  implies that 1 2MPL MPL  
when labor inputs are balanced in quality. Therefore, provided that the first-order 
Taylor’s series provides an acceptable approximation to the nested CES function, then 
the following results are proven to be equivalent 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 when y yq q MPL MPL L L       . 
Nevertheless, the simplified expression of log y  presented above turns out to 
take the form of the log Cobb-Douglas, which could be restrictive for my purpose. 
Particularly, the Cobb-Douglas form imposes a strong restriction asserting that the 
elasticity of substitution between 1L  and 2L  must be unity. To generalize the key 
finding above, this restriction has to be relaxed. Thus, I proceed to consider the 
second-order Taylor’s approximation.94 Besides, the second-order Taylor’s series 
would give a better approximation to the original nested CES function. Hence, I 
expect the economic interpretation of parameters 1 2( , )q q  based on the second-order 
Taylor’s approximation would be more accurate.  
Applying the formula of the Taylor’s expansion gives 
                                               
94 In literature, the CES function is often approximated by the so-called Translog function (see for 
example, Christensen et al., 1973; Chambers, 1988), which could be viewed as the second-order 
Taylor’s approximation of the CES function. 
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0 0
0 1 10 2 20
1 2
2 2 2
2 20 0 0
1 10 2 20 1 10 2 202 2
1 2 1 2
(1 )
log log log
log log(1 )
log [log ( ) ( )
log log log1 1
( ) ( ) ( )( )]
2 2
y A g
g g
A g L L L L
L L
g g g
L L L L L L L L
L L L L

 


 


  
 
      
 
  
      
   
 
Rearranging and simplifying the right-hand side term gives 
1 10 2 20
1 10 2 20
1 10 2 20
1 10 2 20 1 10 2 20
2 21 10 2 20
1 10 2 202
1 10 2 20
1 10
1 10 2 20
log log log( )
(log log ) (log log )
( )( )1
[(log log ) (log log )]
2 ( )
1 1
{ (log
2
y A q L q L
q L q L
L L L L
q L q L q L q L
q L q L
L L L L
q L L
q L L
q L q L
 
 
   
 
 

 
 
 



   
   
 
   



2 2
1 10 2 20 2 20log ) (log log ) }.L q L L L
  
 
Hence, the input-output elasticities are given by 
1
1
1 10 1 10 2 20
1 10 2 202
1 10 2 20 1 10 2 20
1 10
1 10
1 10 2 20
log
log
( )( )
(1 ){ [(log log ) (log log )]
( )
(log log )}
y
y
L
q L q L q L
L L L L
L q L L q L
q L
L L
q L q L
  
   

 

 
 



     
 
 

 
2
2
2 20 1 10 2 20
1 10 2 202
1 10 2 20 1 10 2 20
2 20
2 20
1 10 2 20
log
log
( )( )
(1 ){ [(log log ) (log log )]
( )
(log log )}
y
y
L
q L q L q L
L L L L
q L q L q L q L
q L
L L
q L q L
  
   

 

 



     
 
 

 
If the expansion point is again chosen at a point along the ray 10 20 ,  L L  
0  , the expressions of elasticities can be simplified as 
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1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
(1 )[ (log log ) (log log )];
(1 )[ (log log ) (log log )].
y
y
q q q L L q L
q q q L L q L
  
  
     
     

  
Furthermore, when labor inputs are balanced, that is, 1 2L L L  , we obtain 
1 2
1 2
1 1
2 2
| (1 ) (1 log log )
| (1 ) (1 log log )
y L L L
y L L L
q L
q L
 
 
 
 
   
   


 
Thus, the expressions for the parameters 1 2( , )q q  are given by 
1 2
1 2
1
1
2
2
|
;
(1 )(1 log log )
|
.
(1 )(1 log log )
y L L L
y L L L
q
L
q
L




 
 

  

  


 
Consequently, 1 2q q  implies 1 2y y   when labor inputs are balanced in 
quality. Moreover, it implies also that 1 2MPL MPL  under the same condition. 
However, unlike the previous discussion based on the first-order Taylor’s series, 
these results are not always equivalent when labor inputs are balanced. This is 
because 1y  and 2y  are input-output elasticities and thus their values should be 
non-negative. Hence, these results are equivalent if these labor inputs are balanced 
and if the additional restriction 1 2L L L e     is satisfied. 
To conclude, by approximating the two-level nested CES function by a second- 
order Taylor’s series around 10 20( , ) ( , )L L    , the following results are proven to be 
equivalent. 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, when y yq q MPL MPL L L L e          . 
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This conclusion is no doubt the most important finding in this appendix. With 
this finding, I make the economic interpretation for parameters 1 2( , )q q  explicitly, 
just as what has been argued at the beginning of this appendix. In addition, this 
finding could also serve as a useful guidance to order different types of labor inputs 
whose characteristics such as education, age or working experiences and possibly 
gender are different in terms of their “intrinsic” skills. 
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APPENDIX D 
DATA APPENDIX 
The data are drawn from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
longitudinal data in years 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009.95 In each 
year, the survey covers up to nine provinces that vary substantially in geographic, 
economic and health indicators: They are Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou.96 The CHNS data provide detailed 
information on health, demographic and socioeconomic factors (such as employment 
and earnings) at individual, household and community levels. Partly because of its 
accessibility, the CHNS data is one of the most widely used microdata from China. 
(1) Skill Components and Imputations 
The CHNS data offer two alternative measures of individual agents’ educational 
attainments, namely the years of schooling (a11) and the highest degree of education 
(a12). The former is useful in preparing descriptive statistics (Section 6.2.1) and in 
estimating the Mincerian earning functions (Section 6.2.3), while the latter is useful in 
subdividing total labor force into skill groups and thus in estimating agricultural 
production functions of household farms (Section 6.1). In original CHNS data, 
educations are sometimes missing. I attempt to recover some of them by making use 
of the panel structure of the data. For instance, if a person’s education is missing at 
one survey, then I will search for his education in previous and subsequent surveys. 
Suppose his educations in both surveys are available and they happen to be the same, 
                                               
95 For more details, interested readers should refer to the CHNS documents, questionnaires in all years 
and the working manuals in 1993 and 2006. 
96 The rankings of these provinces in terms of the per capita GDP, 2000 are 8, 10, 6, 9, 18, 13, 17, 29 
and 31 among the 31 provinces reported in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2000. 
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the missing education is replaced by one from adjacent surveys. Also, if a person’s 
education is missing, but his education is available in the previous survey and it is 
known that he left school at the time of previous survey (a13=0), then the missing 
education is replaced by education in previous survey. Besides, if one of the measures 
of education is missing, then I impute the missing one using the non- missing 
alternative measure whenever possible. 
The information on age is also missing for a small number of individual 
observations. I impute missing age of a person using his ages available from other 
surveys and the interview dates of two surveys. The potential working experience is 
defined for workers as the years since they left school and entered the labor market, 
that is, experience = age - schooling - 6. 
(2) Agricultural Employments 
The agricultural workers are defined as rural workers who are engaged in one of 
the following agricultural activities: household farming, gardening and livestock- 
raising. For each of these activities, I construct a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the worker reports his participation or if he reports positive working hours in it, and 0 
otherwise. A household is identified as an agricultural household if the respondent 
reports the participation of this household in agriculture or if one of its members is 
identified as an agricultural worker. Notice that agricultural workers may also be 
employed in non-agricultural sector and earn wages in that sector. 
Suppose the labor inputs is homogeneous and perfectly substitutive in household 
agricultural production, the total labor input of a household farm can be obtained by 
simply aggregating labor services provided by all household members who are 
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identified as agricultural workers. To be concrete, the amount of agricultural labor 
inputs can be measured either in persons or in hours. A worker’s annual agricultural 
working hours are constructed by multiplying months worked per year, a constant 
4.35 – average weeks per month, days worked per month and hours worked per day 
for all three agricultural activities and then adding them together. 
Alternatively, suppose like in Chapters 4 and 5 the labor inputs are in fact 
heterogeneous, labor inputs endowed with different skill components should be 
treated as separate entries of agricultural production. In this thesis, I categorize all 
agricultural workers and their labor services into two educational groups: workers 
without junior high school diploma and those with junior high school diploma or 
higher degrees. Meanwhile, I categorize the same population into two age groups: 
workers aged below 35 and those above 35 years old. Altogether, there are four 
broadly defined education-age cells. The amounts of persons and annual hours 
worked are calculated within all of four education-age cells. 
Year Skill Cell Migratory Staying 
1991 
JHS-×YG 0.31 0.22 
JHS-×MA 0.07 0.31 
JHS-×OA 0.05 0.13 
JHS×YG 0.40 0.20 
JHS×MA 0.04 0.07 
JHS×OA 0.01 0.01 
JHS+×YG 0.11 0.05 
JHS+×MA 0.01 0.02 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.00 
1993 
JHS-×YG 0.35 0.18 
JHS-×MA 0.08 0.31 
JHS-×OA 0.03 0.14 
JHS×YG 0.40 0.21 
JHS×MA 0.03 0.09 
JHS×OA 0.00 0.01 
JHS+×YG 0.10 0.04 
JHS+×MA 0.01 0.03 
JHS+×OA 0.02 0.00 
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(Continuation) 
1997 
JHS-×YG 0.36 0.18 
JHS-×MA 0.02 0.28 
JHS-×OA 0.02 0.15 
JHS×YG 0.51 0.21 
JHS×MA 0.01 0.09 
JHS×OA 0.00 0.01 
JHS+×YG 0.08 0.04 
JHS+×MA 0.01 0.04 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.00 
2000 
JHS-×YG 0.22 0.13 
JHS-×MA 0.03 0.27 
JHS-×OA 0.01 0.15 
JHS×YG 0.56 0.21 
JHS×MA 0.05 0.13 
JHS×OA 0.00 0.02 
JHS+×YG 0.13 0.04 
JHS+×MA 0.02 0.05 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.00 
2004 
JHS-×YG 0.18 0.09 
JHS-×MA 0.06 0.24 
JHS-×OA 0.02 0.20 
JHS×YG 0.51 0.16 
JHS×MA 0.07 0.18 
JHS×OA 0.00 0.03 
JHS+×YG 0.16 0.03 
JHS+×MA 0.01 0.06 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.01 
2006 
JHS-×YG 0.18 0.07 
JHS-×MA 0.09 0.22 
JHS-×OA 0.01 0.21 
JHS×YG 0.43 0.17 
JHS×MA 0.11 0.18 
JHS×OA 0.00 0.04 
JHS+×YG 0.14 0.04 
JHS+×MA 0.03 0.06 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.01 
2009 
JHS-×YG 0.12 0.04 
JHS-×MA 0.14 0.20 
JHS-×OA 0.02 0.25 
JHS×YG 0.35 0.14 
JHS×MA 0.17 0.20 
JHS×OA 0.01 0.06 
JHS+×YG 0.15 0.04 
JHS+×MA 0.04 0.05 
JHS+×OA 0.00 0.01 
Table D.1: Skill Structures of Migratory and Staying Rural Workers 
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Note: The notations “JHS-”, “JHS” and “JHS+” refer to worker groups without junior high school 
diploma, with exact junior high school diploma, and with senior high school, or college diploma. “YG”, 
“MA” and “OA” refer to worker groups aged between 15 and 34, 35-54, and 55-75. The notation “×” 
means “and”. 
(3) Non-Labor Agricultural Inputs 
The non-labor agricultural inputs include land, material and capital. The land 
cultivated by rural households is directly available from the CHNS data. When land is 
missing for some rural households, I impute land using the similar strategy as I did for 
the missing education. The information on the land redistribution (e11e) is used in 
these imputations whenever feasible. Since the CHNS data provide no information on 
detailed material inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, energy etc., I have to approximate 
the material input by the available production cost data. The capital input measures 
the market values of all farm machinery and draft animals (before CHNS 1993) 
employed in household agricultural production. I manage to construct the capital input 
by multiplying the unit price and amount of each of the farm machinery and draft 
animals and then adding them. Unfortunately, the constructed capital input is likely to 
be very inaccurate and thus cannot be used in estimations. By inspecting the data, I 
tend to attribute the inaccuracy of the capital data to the large amount of measurement 
errors in unit prices of farm machinery and draft animals reported in the original data, 
since it is not uncommon to find the cases where unit prices of the same machinery 
owned by the same household vary dramatically across years. 
(4) Total Agricultural Income 
The total agricultural income equals to the sum of market values of final products 
(including sold and self-consumed) of household farming, gardening and livestock 
raising. Unlike the conventional practice of the CHNS-team, if income earned from 
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one of three agricultural activities is found to be missing, I set the total agricultural 
income to be missing. 
(5) Migration Status 
In this thesis, rural migrants are defined as those who left the village where his 
household resides for at least six months. This definition bears some similarity to that 
adopted in the Chinese Population Census, 2000 onwards, except that the latter puts 
emphasis on the destination region. To apply such definition to the CHNS data, I need 
thus two sets of variables indicating where and when rural workers move out. Because 
of the redesign of the questionnaires, variables used to construct the migration dummy 
are slightly different before and after CHNS 1993. In CHNS 1991 and 1993, the 
variables a7 (“How many months did [you] not live here?”), aa12 (“When moved 
out?”) are used to determine whether a rural worker moved out for at least six months, 
aa13 (“Where lives now?”) is used to determine whether he stayed in the same 
community where his household resides. In CHNS 1997 and later surveys, however, 
a5e (“Still live your household?”) and aa12 are employed for the first purpose, while 
a5f (“How long gone?”) and aa13 are employed for the second. 
The advantage of adopting this definition lies partly in its resemblance to that in 
the Chinese Population Census, and partly in its applicability to a longer period. By 
contrast, many scholars propose to use variable a5e alone to identify rural migrants. 
Unfortunately, this variable appears for the first time in CHNS 1997. Admittedly, 
given that applying the definition preferred by this thesis requires somewhat different 
sets of variables in two sub-periods, the consistency of the definition could be difficult 
to check. 
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Moreover, rural workers who are not identified as migrants are labeled as staying 
workers. Rural migratory households are defined as rural households with at least one 
migrant. The rest of rural households are non-migratory. 
Considering that the definition above relies little on the occupational information 
of rural residents, the identified rural migrants may include those who have weak or 
no attachments to the labor market. Therefore, I will further restrict to rural migratory 
and staying residents who were not at school and who were in their working ages at 
the time of survey when necessary. 
Further details on the data management, the definitions of samples and variables 
essential for estimation and prediction that allow an exact reproduction of the results 
presented in Chapter 6 are documented in a series of Stata do files, which can be 
available from the author upon request. 
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